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This dissertation contains three essays that combine applied models, institutional analysis and 
empirical work in order to understand developments in the Russian and Caspian energy sector following 
the breakup of the former Soviet Union. In the first essay entitled “Partial Privatization: Evidence from 
the Russian Oil Sector” (joint with Daniel Berkowitz), we document that Russia’s oil sector privatization 
has been partial because the federal government has maintained ownership rights in several vertically 
integrated companies and has established a near monopoly position in the allocation of scarce export 
transport capacity.  We develop the proposition that in these circumstances the federal government would 
tend to give companies in which it has ownership positions preferential access to world export markets. 
We develop a classification system of company ownership that distinguishes between state-influence and 
state-independent companies. Using censored-regression techniques, we find compelling evidence that the 
state-influence companies had privileged access to export transport by 2003, and argue that this suggests 
that there are substantial efficiency losses in the Russian oil sector.   
The second essay, “Caspian Oil Boom: Informational Herding among the Oil Companies”,  
analyzes the potential causes of the Caspian oil rush of 1997-1998. It provides an institutional description 
of foreign investment in the Caspian region in 1997-1998, and looks at different possible explanations for 
the investment boom. We argue that informational herding among oil companies could have contributed 
to the high investment activity in the region in the late 1990s, and qualitatively check for the power of the 
herding against the alternative explanations. 
In the third essay, “Quality of Information, Information Externalities and Sequential Decisions of 
Oil Companies,” we develop a theoretical model that works out the logic and mechanics of the 
informational herding explanation for the Caspian oil boom. We show that under certain conditions a 
second company to enter will invest in the development of a new oil field even if it received a bad 
informative signal about the profitability of the project. We also show that when companies receive noisy 
public and private information, the second company may be more likely to invest after receiving a bad 
signal. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation contains three essays that combine applied models, institutional analysis and 
empirical work in order to understand developments in the Russian and Caspian energy sector 
following the breakup of the former Soviet Union.  
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and the newly 
independent states of the Caspian region (namely, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) 
found themselves in control of vast oil and gas reserves. Russia inherited not only worked out 
Western Siberian oil fields, but also untapped Sakhalin oil deposits as well as the ownership of 
the world’s biggest gas reserves. The Caspian states, on the other hand, got access to poorly 
explored oil and gas deposits which had been considered an important strategic reserve in the 
former USSR. Both Russia and the Caspian states believed that their oil and gas sectors would 
become an important, if not the main, force behind their economic development and transition to 
a market economy.  
The strategies of how to use the oil and gas potential to promote economic development 
differed in each state. Since the newly-independent states were formed in an institutional and 
legal vacuum in the early 1990s, the development of their oil and gas industries depended on 
how these states tried to fill in this vacuum. Russia privatized oil production very quickly, but 
kept control over the oil transportation system which allowed the Russian state to “squeeze” oil 
producers for the sake of the budget. The Caspian states, on the other hand, adopted more 
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investor-friendly policies and managed to attract a great deal of international investment in a 
short period of time. However, despite an early vast interest in the Caspian oil deposits, 
investment in the Caspian oil industry turned out to be unprofitable in most of the cases.    
The Russian Federation and the Caspian states gained more influential positions in the 
world market because of the recent fast growth of oil prices. Recent conflicts over gas exports 
between the Ukraine and Russia in January 2006, as well as construction of a Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline that will allow landlocked Caspian oil to bypass Russia, showed that Russia and 
the Caspian states have become major players on the world energy market. Russia’s decision to 
stop gas shipments to the Ukraine affected not only exports to the CIS countries, but also exports 
to Western Europe. Opening a pipeline bypassing Russia will make Turkey a primary market for 
Caspian energy, as well as decreasing the economic dependency of the Caspian states on the 
Russian pipeline system. 
However, to better understand how Russian and Caspian oil and gas will affect the world 
energy market, it is important to study the strengths and limitations of the oil and gas sectors of 
the former Soviet states. In the first essay entitled “Partial Privatization: Evidence from the 
Russian Oil Sector” (joint with Daniel Berkowitz), we document that Russia’s oil sector 
privatization has been partial because the federal government has maintained substantial 
ownership rights in many vertically integrated companies, and the federal government has 
established a near monopoly position in the allocation of scarce export transport capacity.  We 
develop the proposition that in these circumstances the federal government would tend to give 
companies in which it has ownership positions preferential access to world export markets, and it 
would use quotas to force private companies to sell on the domestic and CIS markets.  
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To test this proposition, we compile a large data set that includes company-level and 
subsidiary-level data on annual crude production, exports by route, regional cost conditions, 
number of wells, productivity of wells and distance from each subsidiary to the point of export, 
and route costs. We develop a classification of company ownership that distinguishes between 
state-influence and state-independent companies. Using censored-regression techniques, we find 
compelling evidence that the state-influence companies had privileged access to export routes by 
2003, and argue that this suggests that there are substantial efficiency losses in the Russian oil 
sector.   
The second and third essays, “Caspian Oil Boom: Informational Herding among the Oil 
Companies” and “Quality of Information, Information Externalities and Sequential Decisions of 
Oil Companies”, analyze the potential causes of the Caspian oil rush of 1997-1998. The 
“Caspian Oil Boom” documents that foreign investment in the Caspian region was excessive 
because expected returns were low relative to expected costs. The paper then provides an 
institutional description of foreign investment in the Caspian region in 1997-1998, and looks at 
different possible explanations for the investment boom. We argue that informational herding 
among oil companies could have contributed to the high investment activity in the region in the 
late 1990s, and qualitatively check for the power of the herding against the alternative 
explanations. 
In the third essay entitled “Quality of Information, Information Externalities and 
Sequential Decisions of Oil Companies,” we develop a theoretical model that works out the logic 
and mechanics of the herding explanation for the Caspian oil boom. Herding models are driven 
by social learning dynamics, and they typically deliver the prediction that when the actions of 
decision-makers may reveal some of their private information, eventually everyone mimics the 
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predecessor’s choice. Following this framework, we show that under certain conditions a second 
company to enter will invest in the development of a new oil field even if it received a bad 
informative signal about the profitability of the project. We also show that when companies 
receive noisy public and private information, the second company may be more likely to invest 
after receiving a bad signal. 
This model emphasizes that information spillovers are essential in the exploration of new 
and poorly explored fields. The results of the paper suggest that it is important to have a 
mechanism that will allow oil companies to share their private information before making 
investment decisions. This will reduce the noisiness of available information and improve the 
quality of decisions.  
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2.0  ESSAY ONE  
PRIVATIZATION WITH GOVERNMENT CONTROL:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE RUSSIAN OIL SECTOR 
 (with Daniel Berkowitz) 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Governments around the world have been privatizing large state owned enterprises in sectors that 
are of national strategic importance including oil, gas and electricity. Many of these 
privatizations have effectively been “partial” because national governments either manage to 
keep a major stake in the privatized companies or often retain control of a strategic distribution 
method even for fully privatized companies (Megginson, 2005).  For example, the state share is 
remarkably large in some local gas and oil giants including Petrobras in Brazil (32%), Eni in 
Italy (36.9%) and Sinopec in China (77.4%). In India, the generation of electricity has been 
privatized, but the transmission of electricity is monopolized by government electricity boards. It 
has been alleged that that Indian national government uses its control over transmission to force 
privatized generating companies to supply electricity to poor rural areas at  below-market prices 
and at high cost because there is poor transmission equipment and theft from the transmission 
lines in these rural areas (Smith, 1993).  
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There has been a considerable body of work on how the state uses or abuses its powers in 
privatization programs where it manages to obtain substantial ownership positions in privatized 
companies (see Megginson, 2005 for a summary). However, there are no, to our knowledge, 
quantitative studies of how governments behave in a partial privatization in which they retain 
control over strategic distribution assets. This is surprising since there are many examples of this 
including the privatization of electricity in India and the small privatization program in Russia 
where local governments often retained de facto control rights by retaining de jure ownership of 
the land on which newly privatized shops operated (see Barberis et al, 1996).1  
In this esay we argue that the privatization of the Russian oil sector during 1994-2003 is a 
useful case study of how governments use their control rights over strategic distribution assets 
during a privatization. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the emerging 
Russian federal government gained jurisdiction over the major oil fields in Russia; and, it also 
retained control over the transport of oil exports from both Russia and many of the newly 
independent countries. Starting in 1994 many former state oil companies were privatized. This 
privatization has been partial because the federal government has obtained ownership positions 
in several companies and has also retained full control over the transport of oil onto lucrative 
world markets. In this paper, then, we seek to understand if the state effectively uses its control 
over the export pipeline to discriminate between fully privatized companies and those companies 
in which it has substantial ownership positions. And, we check whether government control over 
the oil export pipeline promotes or detracts from efficiency.   
The theoretical analysis in Grossman and Hart (1986) and then in Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1996) suggests that the federal government would tend to impose tight quotas and 
                                                 
1 However, for a study of how governments relinquish control over time after privatizing and its consequences for 
performanace, see Boubakir et al (2005). 
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extract rents from companies over which it has limited influence (for herein state-independent 
firms) versus those over which it has influence (for herein denoted state-influence firms). The 
idea is that the federal government can hold up any company using its control over a key 
distribution asset, which in the case of the Russian crude oil sector is the transport pipeline. 
Companies are differentiated by their ownership rights over residual cash flows. There are fully 
private companies (e.g., Yukos) in which outsiders have full cash flow rights. There are other 
companies (e.g., LUKoil or Tatneft) where the federal government or some regional government 
have substantial or even close to full cash flow rights. When the federal government imposes 
quotas on enterprises over which it has some cash flow rights, it must also bear the financial 
costs of this diversion of oil from lucrative world markets. This implies that the federal 
government is more likely to impose costly regulation on companies owned largely by outside 
investors and regional governments.   
In this essay we check for the differential treatment of state-independent versus state-
influence firms. We find that by 2003, in fact, state-influence firms have privileged access to 
state controlled export markets and that this privilege detracted from efficiency.  In particular, 
state-independent companies had to be much more productive than state-influence companies to 
receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence companies had preferential access to 
routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs 
only in the state-influence sector.  
 The rest of this essay is organized as follows. The next Section describes the evolution of 
ownership and structure in the Russian oil sector; Section 2.3 describes how the federal 
government controls transport of oil to world markets; Section 2.4 sketches a simple theory of 
partial privatization that generates the hypothesis that export allocations are tighter in state-
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independent versus state-influence companies; Section 2.5 describes our data for testing this 
hypothesis; Section 2.6 presents our results about the differential treatment of state-independent 
versus state-influence companies; and Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 OWNERSHIP AND STRUCTURE 
This section describes ownership trends and structural dynamics in Russia’s crude oil sector. We 
develop a typology of company ownership based on state shares and federal government 
representation on company boards. We argue that Russian oil companies can be classified as 
either private, private with regional government influence,  private with federal government 
influence or state companies and that it is appropriate to refer to the latter two forms of 
companies as state-influence companies. We also show that the expansion of state-independent 
companies was more likely to be based on efficiency considerations than the expansion of state-
influence companies. 
2.2.1 Ownership  
Privatization of the oil sector was regulated by Presidential Ordinance #1403 approved on 
November 17, 1992 (President of Russian Federation, 1992). Vertically-integrated companies 
(for herein, we will often use the Russian expression and call them “mothers”) were created by 
joining some oil-producing enterprises and refineries into open-stock companies2. The shares of 
the newly-created mothers were distributed through several complex and frequently 
nontransparent auctions. The insiders who were allowed to participate in the bidding gained 
                                                 
2 An open-stock company publicly trades its shares; a closed-stock company distributes its shares through closed 
subscription based on the decisions of the company’s founders.   
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control over mothers with huge potential value in exchange for relatively small cash amounts 
(Megginson, 2005). Some of the smaller oil-producing enterprises were also transformed into 
open-stock companies and then later either became absorbed by a mother and/or had their stock 
allocations sold in an auction, or became joint ventures.  
The privatization of the oil sector mothers during 1997-2003 was partial because the 
federal government managed to maintain some substantial ownership positions. As is 
documented in Table 1, during 1997-2003 there were three types of vertically-integrated oil 
companies: those fully owned by outside investors, companies where the federal government had 
majority or substantial minority shareholder positions (denoted F in Table 2.8.1) and companies 
where regional governments had substantial ownership (denoted as R in Table 2.8.1). In 1997 
only four of the thirteen mothers were fully owned by outside investors, seven companies were 
either fully or partially owned by the federal government and two were owned by regional 
governments (the Repubic of Tatarstan owned 30-% of Tatneft and the Republic of 
Bashkotorstan owned 63-% of Bashneft).  
By 1999 the federal government had managed to preserve its significant ownership 
positions in the crude oil production sector; and, the federal government had also placed its 
representatives on the Boards of Directors (herein Boards) of the companies where it had 
ownership. In most of the cases, the federal government representatives were from the agencies 
that oversaw the oil sector. For example, LUKoil’s Board of 1999 included the Deputy Minister 
of Fuel and Energy, which at the time was responsible for allocating pipeline capacity for exports 
(see section 3). Another member of the Board was the top manager of the State Antimonopoly 
Committee, which had the responsibility of ensuring that large companies such as the oil mothers 
engaged in competitive business practice. Hence, federal representation on boards allowed the 
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state not only to directly influence the mothers’ decisions, but also established connections 
between mothers and the federal agencies with substantial influence over the crude oil sector. 
The regional governments also had influence on decisions of the mothers in which they 
had substantial ownership positions. However, we found no evidence that the local governments 
had any connections to the federal agencies that supervised the oil sector. Moreover, the regional 
governments in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan were highly independent and often pursued policies 
that conflicted with federal rules (see Treisman, 1999). Thus, regional ownership and 
representation on the boards is not related to federal government influence.  
The above analysis suggests that we can refer to state-owned mothers and mothers where 
federal government had significant interest as state-influence companies. On the other hand, 
regionally controlled and entirely private companies are appropriately denoted state-independent 
companies. In other words, “state” in “state-influence” and “state-independent” companies refers 
to the federal government. 
By 2003, federal government ownership in the oil sector had decreased. The federal 
government owned one vertically integrated company, Rosneft (responsible for 5% of total 
Russian production) and had a significant share of 7.6% in the biggest Russian oil producer 
LUKoil. It also had seats on the boards of these companies: ten representatives out of eleven in 
Rosneft and one representative out of eleven total in LUKoil. Thus, by 2003 the federal 
government still retained substantial influence over several major oil mothers.  
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2.2.2  Structure  
The oil sector has become more concentrated over time and there have been differences in 
expansion dynamics for the different mothers. By the late 1990s, the mothers started 
aggressively acquiring new subsidiaries, merging with other oil companies and/or buying out the 
stocks of other shareholders in the smaller oil producing stock companies. Some mothers 
expanded to new oil producing regions and some mothers exited. 
As a result of these expansions, Russian crude production and exports became more 
concentrated over time. By 2002, three firms (LUKoil, Yukos and Surgutneftegaz) were 
responsible for over 50% of total production and total exports: the 3-firm concentration ratio, R3, 
in production grew from 0.4 in 1997 to 0.51 in 2002; R3 in exports increased from 0.33 to 0.51 
between 1997 and 2002, respectively3 (see Table 2.8.2).  
LUKoil, a state-influence company during 1997-2003, and Yukos, a state-independent 
company during 1997-2003, had the most aggressive expansion programs. Between 1997 and 
2003 LUKoil acquired 33 new subsidiaries and Yukos obtained five new subsidiaries, including 
one mother (VNK). However, as Table 3 documents, the expansion programs were very 
different. LUKoil mostly expanded its influence to two new regions, Urals, an old oil region with 
relatively low productivity fields, and the North (Komi), a relatively new and poorly developed 
oil region. As a result, in 2003 productivity of the newly acquired subsidiaries varied from 1.63 
thousand tons per average well in the Urals to 8.5 per average well in Komi. Yukos, on the other 
                                                 
3 Concentration of Russian oil production sector is very high compared to other states where oil production is 
privatized. For example, in the United States, the third biggest oil producer in the world after Saudi Arabia and 
Russia, the 2-firm concentration ratio of oil production sector is 0.25; the three biggest US oil operators control only 
0.33 per cent of total oil production (EIA, 2005). 
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hand, improved its existing position within Western Siberia, which is the most productive 
Russian oil region. As a result, between 1997 and 2003 Yukos’s average productivity in the 
region increased from 2.68 to 10.78 thousand tons per well. Table 2.8.4 documents that whether 
we use return on assets or return on non-current (primarily property, plant and equipment), 
between 1999-2003 Yukos was more profitable than LUKoil. Thus, the evidence in Tables 2.8.3 
and 2.8.4 suggests that between 1997-2003 the expansion policy of the state-independent Yukos 
was driven more by profit criteria than the expansion policy in the state-influence company 
LUKoil. 
The expansion policies of the state-independent Sidanko and the state-influence company 
Rosneft are similar (we cannot make comparisons with other companies because either they 
change ownership between 1997-2003, and/or they do not expand). As Table 2.8.3 documents, 
Sidanko improved its productivity in Western Siberia from 2 to 7.4 thousand tons per well and 
its output in the less productive Volga region grew from 3.4 to 4.74 thousand tons per well. Fully 
state-owned Rosneft, on the other hand, started developing the new North region, where it 
achieved productivity of 28.47 thousand tons per well, while maintaining less productive 
subsidiaries in the worked-out North Caucasus region that produced on average 1.31 thousand 
tons of oil per well. 
In summary, this section has made several points about ownership and structure in the 
Russian oil sector. First, the privatization was partial and vertically-integrated companies in the 
crude oil sector can be divided into state-influence companies and state-independent companies. 
Second, after privatization, the oil sector was highly concentrated and its concentration increased 
over time. Third, companies that remained state-independent used economic criterion in their 
expansions in 1997-2003. 
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2.3 CONTROL 
In this section we argue that the federal government has the power to control exports because of 
its almost complete monopoly position as transporter of crude oil onto domestic-CIS and world 
markets. Because selling crude at world market is preferred to selling it domestically (due to 
substantial price spreads during 1997 and 2003 and non-payment problems in domestic and CIS 
markets), we argue that this ability to control exports gives the federal government considerable 
leverage over all companies. 
The profits of Russian oil mothers depend very much on their crude exports. As it is 
documented in Table 2.8.5, in 1997-2003 mothers exported on average about 20-35% of the total 
crude they produced; the state-owned Rosneft consistently exported the largest share of its 
production compared to other mothers. One reason for the reliance on exports was the significant 
spread between the domestic and world prices for crude oil. According to The Wall Street 
Journal in February of 2003, local oil selling prices were as low as $5 per barrel, compared to 
$31 per barrel on the world market (Anna Raff for The Wall Street Journal, 2003.) Another 
reason for the reliance was that international buyers were more likely than customers in Russia 
and the CIS to pay in a timely fashion.   
Over 95% of total crude exports from Russia are transported through a system of trunk 
pipelines. The system is state-owned and operated by a 100% federally-owned company, 
Transneft4.  Hence, the federal government has almost complete monopoly control over Russian 
oil exports. This extent of federal power is unusual. In most countries where oil production is 
private, oil transportation is also privately provided. For example, in the United States the system 
                                                 
4 As of April, 2005, 100% of common stocks of the company belong to the Federal Agency of Federal Property 
Management (Transneft, 2005). 
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of trunk pipelines is owned and operated by over 3, 000 companies, some of which are oil 
producers, others have no relation to oil production (Office of Pipeline Safety Communications, 
2005). This is also true for Norway where all the segments of its complex oil transportation 
system are operated by oil producers working in the country (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2005).  
According to independent experts, the Transneft pipeline system had in 2001 the capacity 
to ship roughly 153-154 million tons per year (Oil and Capital, 2001). Since 2002, Transneft 
trunk pipelines have been operating at full capacity (Oil and Capital, 2004). As a result of system 
overload, available throughput capacity has to be rationed between the companies. The federal 
government thus has tremendous control over the crude oil sector because of its ability to 
allocate highly valuable capacity to export.   
The export quotas allocation rules were introduced in 1994 and stayed practically 
unchanged through 2003 (Government of Russian Federation, 1994). According to the official 
laws on the books, export pipeline capacity is allocated between the oil companies according to a 
grandfathering rule: each company’s quota is determined by its production in the past quarter. In 
particular, the allocation quotas depend on three factors: the capacity of the Transneft system, the 
production of an exporter in the previous quarter and, since 1997, her tax arrears (Government of 
Russian Federation, 1997). This formal allocation rule does not depend on the willingness of oil 
producers to pay for capacity and so does not promote efficiency. The rules also appear to be 
quite vague as to the exact relationships between past production, route capacity and current 
export access.  
Contrary to the unchanged allocation rules, the agencies enforcing them changed over time. 
Before 2000, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the Interdepartmental Commission (controlled 
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by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy) were responsible for export transport allocations 
(Government of Russian Federation, 1995). The oil export allocation schedule was prepared 
quarterly by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. It received information on the capacity of the 
transportation system and quotas requests of mothers from Transneft, and then sent the 
preliminary schedule to the Interdepartmental Commission for confirmation. The final schedule 
was then sent to Transneft and the mothers. 
The Ministry of Fuel and Energy was controlled mostly by former Soviet officials. 
Berkowitz (2000) documents that in 1995-1996 access to the oil pipeline was highly political. In 
particular, he noted that bribes and political favors played an important role in determining the 
size of the final quota. Furthermore, he also found that it is difficult to separate the impact of 
rules from the impact of the political influence that a company enjoys from being large on export 
allocations. 
In the spring of 2000, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy was restructured and became the 
Ministry of Energy, and the Interdepartmental Commission was dismissed (Government of 
Russian Federation, 2000). As a result of this restructuring, the Ministry of Energy lost a lot of 
its responsibilities to other state institutions. In particular, the main responsibility of quotas 
allocation was shifted to the specially created Commission of Russian Government (Government 
of Russian Federation, 2000) which now was controlled by one of the major players on Putin’s 
team, the Vice Prime Minister.  
Allocating export quotas between the companies is not the only way the state can control 
the oil producers. It is important to mention that Russian crude can be exported through several 
routes that are differentiated by cost.  Thus, not only volume of the quota matters to a producer, 
but also WHERE this volume is allocated to be shipped. Specifically, Russian crude is exported 
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through ports and the pipeline sub-system called Druzhba that delivers oil directly to European 
refineries (see Figure 2.8.1). Over half of the total Russian crude exports go through sea ports 
since exports through the Druzhba subsystem are constrained by the capacity of the European 
refineries to which it is connected.  In 1997 four ports were exporting Russian crude: Russian 
Novorossyisk and Tuapse, Ukrainian Odessa and Latvian Ventspils. By 2003 three more export 
ports appeared: Lithuanian Baltic export terminal Butinge5 in 1999, Russian Baltic port Primorsk 
in 2001 and Ukrainian oil terminal “Yuzhnyi” in 2003.  
The export costs of different routes can be roughly estimated by using the costs of 
delivering oil to a refinery or a port and the costs of oil transshipment in the port. The costs of 
shipping oil are determined by the operators of the pipelines. Oil transshipment costs are 
separately determined in each port. They include costs of transferring oil from a pipeline to a 
terminal and then to a tanker. The export and transshipment costs at different export routers are 
presented in Table 2.8.6. The table shows that Transneft (the operator of the Russian pipeline 
system) offers the best transit tariffs and that working with non-Russian countries adds 
substantial costs. Hence, the Druzhba route to Europe is the cheapest since the producers only 
have to pay transit costs and avoid transshipment costs. However, because of the capacity 
constraints of the European refineries, this route may not be the most profitable since it allows 
exporting limited volumes of crude. Among the sea exporting terminals, Russian ports charge 
relatively small transshipment costs. This makes Russian ports the most desirable among sea 
export routes.  
                                                 
5 Yukos bought control of Butinge in mid-2002 from the American company Williams (Oil and Capital News, 
2002a; Oil and Capital News, 2002b). 
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In summary, the Russian oil transport system can be characterized by the following 
features. First, exporting onto world markets is more lucrative than shipping onto the domestic or 
CIS market. Second, the Russian federal government has substantial leverage in the oil industry 
because it has a nearly monopoly position in allocating scarce transport capacity for world 
market exports. Third, the Russian federal government’s procedure for allocating export capacity 
is unrelated to efficiency criterion and is rather non-transparent. Fourth, the allocation rules did 
not change much in 1997-2003.  Finally, besides controlling export quotas, the federal 
government also controls the allocation of company world market exports through particular 
export routes that are differentiated by their costs. Druzhba and Russian ports are the cheapest 
export routes for Russian crude, and shipping through non-Russian countries to obtain access to 
world markets adds substantial costs.  
2.4 THEORY 
This section develops a simple theory of just how differences in ownership can influence the 
state allocation of export quotas to companies. In our model, there is a state regulatory body that 
allocates export capacity, Q, in the form of access to a pipeline route to a company. In turn, the 
company chooses the share of its oil output that it exports on world markets and the share that 
goes to the domestic/CIS market. The world price exceeds the domestic/CIS price: Pw > Pd. This 
captures two features of the Russian oil market that we have already noted: first, world prices are 
usually higher and, second, many domestic and CIS refineries delay or simply withhold 
payments while this is not an issue on world markets. Formally, a company solves the following 
program: 
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L denotes a variable input such as labor, f(L) is a non-decreasing, continuous and concave 
production function that converts L into oil output, α is the share of output that is exported on 
world markets, (1-α) is the share shipped to the domestic-CIS market and Q denotes the export 
quota. The parameter β captures ownership; when β is close to unity the company has close to 
full rights to it residual profits after choosing L, and is categorized as state-independent. As β 
falls and approaches zero the company has most of its cash flows appropriated by the federal 
government and is classified as a state-influence company. 
 In this setup, when the export quota is non-binding, the company chooses α = 1 
and exports all of its output to world markets. It also chooses L so that its marginal value product 
on world markets equals its marginal cost:  
 QLfwhenandLfPw <== *)(,1*1*)(' α               (2) 
 If the quota is binding, then Q = α*f(L) and the company sells (f(L) –Q) on 
domestic/CIS market. In this case, the shadow price of the quota is β(Pw – Pd), which is the 
company’s revenue simply lost by shifting a unit of output sales from the world to domestic-CIS 
market. The company now chooses L so that its marginal value product on domestic markets 
equals its marginal cost:  
*)/(*)(,1*,1*)(' αα QLfandwhereLfPd =<=     (3) 
Equation (3) generates several predictions about the behavior of a quota constrained 
company. First, since cash flow rights apply to revenues net of variable costs, an increase in 
ownership rights has no impact on output or allocations of output to the world and domestic/CIS 
markets: 
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Furthermore, a relaxation of the quota induces a company to shift its sales from the 
domestic-CIS market to world markets without changing overall output: 
 0/*,0/* =∂∂>∂∂ QLQα  
We use this setup to make predictions about how the federal government regulatory 
agency chooses its optimal quota. Our basic premise is that the federal agency is driven by 
political criteria, and wins loyalty, favors and transfers in-kind when it has companies deliver 
cheap oil to its clients on the domestic-CIS market. To capture this idea, we denote the political 
benefits of quotas as Z(f(L) – Q), where Z′ > 0, Z″ < 0. The cost borne by the federal government 
is the loss in revenues by diverting from the world market: (1 – β)(Pw – Pd)(f(L) – Q). Thus, the 
private ownership parameter, β, influences the federal government’s costs of using a quota to 
force a company to ship on the domestic-CIS market. The federal government can pass a higher 
share of its costs of foregoing world market prices to a state-independent company that has a β 
close to unity. However, in a state-influence company where β is much lower, the federal 
government picks up more of the cost.  
 When the quota is binding, the state chooses an optimal quota so that its marginal 
benefit equals its marginal cost: 
 0))(1(' =−−+− dw PPZ β       (4) 
Implicitly differentiating (4), then 
 0''/)(/ <−=∂∂ ZPPQ dwβ       (5) 
Thus, a binding quota becomes tighter as private ownership increases. The logic of this 
result is that an increase in β depresses the marginal cost of diverting oil from the export to the 
domestic/CIS market. This result implies that the federal regulatory agencies would use their 
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control over the oil export pipeline to discriminate against state-independent companies. We will 
take this prediction to the data in what follows.  
2.5 DATA 
The data were acquired from Oil Trade, a statistical annex to Oil and Capital, a leading 
magazine for the Russian oil industry. Our dataset includes subsidiary level export volumes 
through different routes, measures of company size, regional production costs, transportation 
costs and the capacity of each pipeline route. In the dataset we report the exports of 32 
subsidiaries in 1997 and 54 oil subsidiaries in 2003 through each possible route (there are eight 
export routes, but because some routes are very close to each other, we categorize shipments into 
seven possible routes).  
 
2.5.1 Export Volumes 
Export volumes are reported in thousands of tons, and there is a negligible difference in the 
quality of oil exported by the subsidiaries. This is because after a company pumps oil into the 
transport pipeline, that oil is blended with all of the oil currently in the pipeline, so that at the 
final export destination oil generally priced on world markets as the Urals blend.6 In the dataset 
we included exports of only those subsidiaries of mothers that reported production in 1997 and 
                                                 
6 The exceptions to this are exports from the Rosneft subsidiary in the Sakhalin area, which typically prices closer to 
Asian blends, and exports from companies using the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. However, these companies are 
excluded from our sample.  We thank Michael Cohen from the Office of Energy Markets and End Use, the 
Department of Energy, for help with this issue. 
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2003, and reported production was higher than reported exports. The reason to exclude exporting 
subsidiaries with no reported production or reported exports higher than production is the 
possibility that they exported re-distributed oil. Russian mother companies can re-distribute their 
output intended for export between the subsidiaries, i.e., a certain subsidiary may receive 
additional oil, produced by another subsidiary, for export. This re-distribution does not change 
the receiving subsidiary’s production costs, but affects its transportation costs. Since it is 
impossible to tell how much extra oil the subsidiary received, the actual costs of the exporting 
subsidiary are impossible to calculate. There was one exporting subsidiary that did not report 
production in 1997 and four in 2003. One in 1997 reported significantly higher exports than 
production; and, in 2003 all of the subsidiaries’ exports were lower than reported production.    
2.5.2 Company Size   
We use subsidiaries’ number of total wells and number of operating wells as measures of its size. 
We find that both measures are highly correlated with total production: 0.79 for the number of 
total wells and 0.75 for the number of operating wells.  Company size can pick up the 
importance of size for export access, which would include ability to produce and political 
influence. 
 
2.5.3 Company Productivity  
We measure productivity as output per well and output per productive well. We would expect 
this variable to be positively associated with export access when access to world markets is 
based upon efficiency. 
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2.5.4 Regional Production Costs  
We use regional producers’ price (rubles per ton) as a measure of regional production costs. The 
oil-producing subsidiaries included in the dataset are located in six different oil regions of 
Russia. Regional prices capture the region-specific production costs that vary between different 
regions due to different climate zones (e.g., Western Siberia vs. Volga) and had different levels 
of oil production development (e.g., old and high cost wells in the North Caucasus region vs. 
new, poorly developed production infrastructure in the North in the Komi Republic). We 
understand that this measure does not capture all company-specific production costs, but it is the 
best measure available since the mothers do not report their production costs. If access to world 
markets is based upon economic criteria, then we would expect that this variable would be 
negatively associated with exports on world markets. 
2.5.5 Exports Routes  
In 1997, Russian crude exports went through five routes (Druzhba pipeline sub-system; ports of 
Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Ventspils and Odessa); in 2003, the number of export routes for Russain 
oil was seven (Druzhba and ports of Tuapse, Novorossiysk, Primorsk, Odessa, Yuzhnyi and 
Butinge) (see Figure 2.8.1). We do not include the Yuzhnyi export route for 2003 since its 
exports account for less than 0.1% of total exports. Also, since Tuapse and Novorossyisk are 
located very close to each other, we unite these routes and report them as joint Tuapse-
Novorossyik export route. For this route, we use total exports that went through both ports and 
total joint capacity of the two ports. The distance of this route is calculated as average of the 
distances from a subsidiary to each port.  
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Thus, in the dataset we look at the total of four export routes in 1997 (Druzhba, Tuapse-
Novorossyisk, Ventspils and Odessa) and five export routes in 2003 (Druzhba, Primorsk, 
Tuapse-Novorossyisk, Odessa and Butinge). Below we describe how we use data on distance to 
world market on each route and tariffs to compute transportation costs. However, we also control 
for routes to pick up additional factors that would determine the impact of routes on export 
access.  
2.5.6 Transportation Costs  
We have transportation costs for 2003 only. We measure transportation costs as dollars per ton 
per kilometer, i.e., tariff times the distance from the subsidiary’s location to the point of exit onto 
world markets. The tariffs per ton/km of different routes as of 2003 are given in Table 2.8.6. We 
use distance in km from a subsidiary to ports or points of exit as a measure of distance from a 
subsidiary to a particular export point. Distance in km was defined by the shortest route from a 
subsidiary allocation to a port or Russian border (in case of Druzhba) along Transneft trunk 
pipelines. The location of a subsidiary was approximated either by location of its most 
productive fields or by location of its office. The information on the most productive fields was 
taken from mother companies’ websites; the office addresses were obtained from the website of 
the Russian System of Full Information Disclosure and News “Skrin” (http://www.skrin.ru). 
The data on the pipeline routes location was taken from Transneft’s website 
(www.transneft.ru).  To calculate distance between cities where the pipeline nodes are located, 
we used the AutoTransInfo website (http://www.ati.su/) that provides information on distances 
between Russian cities and towns along highways.  We assume that the oil from a subsidiary 
enters the pipeline at the node-city that is closest to the location of the subsidiary. If the 
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allocation of export capacity is related to efficiency considerations, then we would expect to 
observe a negative association for subsidiaries between export volumes on a particular route and 
transportation costs.   
As a robustness check, we also use an alternative distance measure. Following Berkowitz 
(2000), alternative distance is measured in total numbers of Transneft regional sub-systems the 
subsidiary has to pump its oil through to get to the port or Russia border. The two measures are 
highly correlated (0.84).  
2.5.7 Route Capacity 
Route capacity is reported for 2003 only. Capacity of each export route is reported in million 
tons per year in Table 2.8.6. For the Tuapse-Novorossyisk route we use the sum of the capacities 
of the two ports. Since the export system is capacity constrained, we would expect to observe a 
positive association between route capacity and export volumes.   
2.5.8 Additional controls 
As additional control variables, we use route and mothers dummy variables. As previously noted, 
route dummy variables pick additional factors related to access besides transport costs and 
capacity, which could include long term relationships between a subsidiary and a particular 
regional Transneft company. Mother dummies pick mother-specific factors such as political 
connections that could be important for access. 
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2.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We have compiled detailed data on export volumes by route, regional costs, company 
productivity and size in 1997 and 2003. Additionally, in 2003 we have detailed data 
summarizing transportation costs and route capacity. Hence, we first test the prediction that the 
federal regulatory agencies provide preferential access to state-influence companies in 2003 
only. Then, we will perform a less detailed analysis of 2003 and 1997 data and compare the 
results. We will show that in 2003 the state-influence companies indeed received preferential 
treatment, while in 1997 there was no difference in access provided to state-influence and state-
independent companies.  
2.6.1 Analysis of 2003 
We set the indicator variable S = 0 for the state-independent companies and S = 1 for the state-
influence companies and estimate the following model in 2003: 
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Here denotes thousands of tons of oil exported to world markets on the pth pipeline 
route for the ith subsidiary in the mth mother company, reg_costs  denotes regional production 
costs for the ith subsidiary of the mth mother, trans_costs  denotes transportation costs (dollars 
per km per ton) for the ith subsidiary of the mth mother on the pth route, route_capp  denotes the oil 
volume capacity for the pth route, prod   denotes productivity (measured as output per well) of 
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the ith subsidiary of the mth mother, oil_wells  is the number of oil wells (either total or 
operating) in the ith subsidiary of the mth mother and is our proxy for company size, routep is a 
dummy variable for the pth route and motherm is a dummy variable for the mth mother. The odd-
numbered regressors, 
im
j197531 ,,,,, γααααα measure the estimated impact of reg_costs , 
trans_costs , route_capp,  prod , oil_wells ,, routep and motherm  on  . The even 
numbered coefficients, 
im
ipm im im ipm
y
,,,,,, 2108642 jγααααα measure the estimated differential impact of 
these variables on the state-influence net of state-independent sectors and enable to test the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The state influence companies are not privileged because they cannot 
export more than the state-independents if their production costs are higher (the null is )02 =α . 
Hypothesis 2: The state-influence companies do not have privileged access to export 
routes because of their geographic location (the null is 04 =α ); 
Hypothesis 3: The state-influence companies do not receive better access to routes with 
greater capacity (the null is 06 =α ); 
Hypothesis 4: The state-influence companies do not receive privileged treatment because 
they cannot ship more than the state-independents if they are less productive (the null is 08 =α ). 
Our sample includes 270 observations of exports by 54 subsidiaries through the five 
possible routes. However, there are 145 observations in which a particular subsidiary that is an 
exporter does not use at least one of the five available routes. Thus, we use the Tobit procedure 
and censor all the export observations that are zero. 
We test our hypothesis using the km distance measure (results with the alternative 
measure are similar and are available upon request). In Table 2.8.7 the columns entitled State-
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Influence Net of State-Independent present the results relevant to our hypothesis tests (i.e., 
02 =α , ,04 =α 06 =α  and 08 =α ). In addition, the columns entitled State-Independent and 
State-Influence presents estimates of the associations between our independent variables and oil 
exports for the subsidiaries. In each cell we first report point estimates, standard errors (in 
parentheses) and then quantitative significance: this is the point estimate for a regressor times its 
sample standard deviation; it measures the impact of a one-standard deviation increase in the 
independent variable on thousands of tons oil exports.   
Checking column (1) in specifications 1 and 2, we fail to reject the hypothesis 
( )02 =α that the state influence companies are not privileged because of regional production 
costs. However, it is clear from columns (2) and (3) in each specification that only the state-
influence subsidiaries pay attention to regional production costs. A possible explanation of this 
finding is state-independents face tighter capacity constraints and will export as much as the 
federal government allows, while the state-influence companies can be more sensitive to costs. 
We reject the hypothesis ( 04 =α ) that the state influence companies do not have 
preferential access due to their location at 1 % level in both specifications. Once again, the 
estimates in columns (2) and (3) suggest there is a major difference in treatment of state-
independent versus state-influence subsidiaries. For example, the results in specification 2 imply 
that a one standard deviation increase in transport costs is associated with a 1.6 million ton cut in 
exports in the state-influence group and a 1.2 million ton increase in the state-independent group. 
This suggests that the shadow price of the quota is so high for the state-independent companies 
that when state-influence companies reduce their exports following an increase in transportation 
costs, the state-independents pick up this slack capacity.  
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We also reject the hypothesis ( 06 =α ) regarding access to the routes with better capacity 
at 1 % level in both specifications. The point estimates and the quantitative significance 
parameters are striking in this case. For example, in specification 2, a one-standard deviation 
increase in route capacity (roughly 20.8 million tons in exports per year) is associated with 
roughly 1.9 million tons in additional exports in the average state-independent subsidiary; the 
average state-influence subsidiary will export 8.3 million tons more. 
Finally, we reject the hypothesis ( 08 =α ) that there is no discrimination by subsidiary-
productivity per well at the 1 % level. What is striking is that state-independents  export more on 
world markets only if they are more productive while productivity does not matter for state-
influence subsidiaries.  
Thus, there is strong evidence that in 2003 state-influence companies and state-
independent companies are not treated in the same way in the export allocation system. The 
state-independent companies are more efficient, but have relatively limited access to export 
routes. Moreover, since the shadow price of the export quota is high, the state-independent 
companies are forced to behave inefficiently and export more when the transportation costs 
increase and extra export capacity frees up. These results also provide evidence that federal 
government control over the export pipeline is detrimental for efficiency. State-influence 
subsidiaries, on average, are less productive and yet get more access to pipeline capacity.  
2.6.2 Comparison of 1997 and 2003 
It is interesting to check if the federal government has changed in how it has exercised control 
over the pipeline. We have data that enables us to make some rough comparisons between 1997 
and 2003. This is interesting since the reformist Yeltsin government was in power in 1997 while 
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the Putin administration was firmly in control in 2003. As previously noted, we do not have the 
transportation costs and route capacity data for 1997 that we have for 2003. Thus, to compare 
1997 and 2003, we re-estimate equation (6) for 2003 without transportation costs and route 
capacity variables and let route dummy variables pick up all the fixed effects of the routes. Since 
these independent variables are only slightly correlated with the production costs and 
uncorrelated with other independent variables (see Table 2.8.8), the point estimates for the 
impact of productivity in 2003 should not be strongly affected; however, we do expect that the 
estimates for regional costs will change. 
Table 2.8.9 reports estimation results for 1997 and 2003 with number of total wells as a 
proxy of the companies’ size (the results with operating wells are similar and available upon 
request).  As expected, the point estimates for productivity per well in 2003 have not changed 
significantly compared to Table 2.8.7; regional production costs are changed but are not 
statistically significant. Consistent with our estimates from Table 2.8.7, state-influence 
companies have privileged access because state-independent subsidiaries must be more 
productive to get the same access to world markets. However, in 1997 there is no such 
discrimination between state-influence and state-independent subsidiaries.  
This result suggests some changes in the Russian political situation between 1997 and 
2003. In 1997, Boris Yeltsin was in his second Presidential term and the privatization of the 
crude sector was only three years old. There were rumors that on the eve of the highly contested 
Presidential election between Yeltsin and the communist party, several oligarchs offered Yeltsin 
their financial support. Several of these oligarchs (for example, Yukos’s Khodorkhovsky and 
LUKoil’s Vagit Alekperov) owned substantial interests in state-influence and state independent 
companies. After Yeltsin’s win in the summer of 1996, there were rumors that the oligarchs who 
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supported Yeltsin received preferential treatment including access to under-priced blocks of state 
property.  
By 2003 the position of oligarchs in Russia had changed dramatically. The new President 
Putin was following up on his election promise to eliminate corruption. Many of the oligarchs 
who were influential in 1997 were in exile or arrested (for example, Khodorkhovsky). Putin had 
also replaced most of Yeltsin’s officials. In particular, in 2000 the authority to allocate export 
quotas was moved from the Ministry of Fuel and Energy to a new Committee headed by Victor 
Khristenko, Vice Prime Minister at the time. Our results are consistent with the interpretation 
that by 2003 the Putin administration toughened its treatment of oligarchs that operated state-
independent companies while providing concessions to oligarchs associated with state-influence 
companies.   
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Subsequent to the financial crisis of 1998, GDP in Russia has grown at an impressive average 
annual rate of more than 6% (CIA World Fact Book, 2005). One of the major concerns with this 
growth record, however, is that it is driven primarily by high oil prices rather than deep structural 
reform (see Berglöf et al, 2003). In this essay we have documented that the Russian oil sector, 
which is one of Russia’s most profitable sectors, is in need of substantial restructuring. Our 
results show that the partial privatization imposes major inefficiencies for several reasons. First, 
state-influence companies appear to adopt acquisitions policies that are driven by non-economic 
criterion. Second, the allocation of pipeline capacity is sensitive to transportation costs for state-
influence enterprises, but it ignores these costs for state-independents. Third, state-influence 
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companies benefit more from increased capacity of the export routes. Finally, productivity is not 
important for access to the export pipeline for the state-influence companies.  
Furthermore, the Russian federal government continues to influence the oil sector in 
ways that are of concern. In October 2003, the Russian federal government arrested Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the chairman of the management committee of Yukos; this was the beginning of 
a process by which this state-independent mother company was radically downsized. Most 
notably, in 2005 Yukos’s biggest productive subsidiary was sold at roughly 60-percent of its 
market value to the state-owned mother company Rosneft. In October 2005 the state-owned 
natural gas monopoly Gazprom bought the state-independent mother Sibneft. Our analysis of oil 
transport during 1997-2003 provides evidence that partial privatization in fact has allowed the 
federal state to impose major distortions on the operation of a lucrative sector. We plan to 
analyze developments between 2003 and 2005 in future research.   
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2.8 TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 2.8.1 Evolution of Corporate Governance: 1997, 1999 and 2003 
 
1997 1999 2003 
Mothers Share of the State 
 
Share of the State 
 
Representatives of 
Russian Government on 
BOD 
Share of the State 
 
Representatives of 
Russian Government on 
BOD 
LUKoil 26.6
0 
(F) 
26.21  
(F) 
3 out of 11  
(F) 
7.602 
(F) 
1 out of 11  
(F) 
Yukos 03 03 0 04 0 
Sibneft 05 05 0 06 0 
Surgutnefte
rgaz 0
7 07 0 08 0 
Sidanko 09 09 n/a 010 0 
Tatneft 30.34
11 
(R) 
30.911a 
(R) 
5 out of 15 
 (R) 0
12 5 out of 15  (R) 
Onako 85 
13 
(F) 
85 13 
(F) n/a Does not exist Does not exist 
VNK 36
14 
(F) Does not exist Does not exist Does not exist Does not exist 
TNK 49.87
15 
(F) 
49.8715a 
(F) n/a 0
16 0 
Bashneft 63
17 
(R) 
6317 
(R) 
4 out of 14  
(R) 
1.3418 
(R) 
3 out of 9 
 (R) 
Rosneft 96.25
19 
(F) 
96.2519 
(F) n/a 
96.2520 
(F) 10 out of 11 (F) 
Slavneft 77.1
21 
(F) 
77.121a 
(F) 
7 out of 12  
(F) 0
22 0 
KomiTEK 21.7
23  
(F) 
1.0723a  
(F) n/a Does not exist Does not exist 
Russneft Does not exist Does not exist Does not exist 024 0 
Notes: R denotes a regionally owned company and F denotes a federally owned company, and no notation means outside ownership 
0 Vedi (Analytical Laboratory). http://www.vedi.ru/s_pe/pe5101_r.htm
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Table 2.8.2 Concentration of Russian Oil Production and Exports, 1997-2003 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Share of Mothers  0.89 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.88 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.36 Production 
R3 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.47 0.51 0.49 
Share of Mothers  0.69 0.46 0.78 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.88 
R2 0.24 0.18 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.35 Exports 
R3 0.33 0.22 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.47 
Rn -- n-firm concentration ratio 
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Table 2.8.3 Subsidiaries and Average Well Productivity  
 
1997 2003 
Region Mothers # of Producing 
Subsidiaries 
Reported # 
of Wells 
Average 
Production per 
Well (thousand 
tons) 
# of Producing 
Subsidiaries 
Reported # 
of Wells 
Average 
Production per 
Well (thousand 
tons)  
LUKoil 
1  
(+4 
subdivisions) 
15227 2.87 
7 
(+4 
subdivisions) 
16352 6.11 
Yukos 1 10006 2.68 5 12101 10.78 
VNK 2 3879 2.84 - - - 
Sibneft 1 6869 2.64 1 7997 3.93 
Surgutneftegas 1  14133 2.40 1  16964 3.18 
Sidanko 5 6837 2.00 3 3737 7.40 
TNK 3 9614 2.33 4 13277 2.55 
Rosneft 1  2195 2.04  2 2525 3.90 
Slavneft 2 3599 3.41 6 3944 6.78 
Western Siberia 
Russneft - - - 2 1168 2.80 
KomiTEK 1 1609 2.23 - - - 
LUKoil - - - 11 3264 8.50 North 
Rosneft - - - 2 139 28.47 
LUKoil 2 1067 3.08 2 1071 20.43 
Yukos 1 5462 1.56 1 5609 2.20 
Sidanko 1 339 3.70 1 380 4.74 
Tatneft 
1 
 (14 
subdivisions) 
20711 1.18 
1 
 (14 
subdivisions) 
21477 1.15 
Rosneft 1 166 1.50 - - - 
Volga 
Russneft - - - 2 184 2.47 
North Caucasus Rosneft 4 4529 1.37 5 3753 1.31 
LUKoil 1 4670 1.21 5 6257 1.63 
Sidanko 1 4448 1.27 2 4004 1.84 
Onako 2 2773 2.70 - - - 
Bashneft 
1 
 (10 
subdivisions)
16958 0.91 
1  
(10 
subdivisions)
18505 0.65 
Urals 
TNK - - - 2 2885 102.50 
Far East Rosneft 1 2263 0.66 1 2320 0.71 
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 Table 2.8.4 Profitability of LUKoil versus Yukos 
 
Return on Assets Return on Non-Current Assets 
Year 
LUKoil Yukos LUKoil Yukos 
1999 9.6% 20.4% 12.4% 31.4% 
2000 22.4% 41.0% 32.4% 77.5% 
2001 11.4% 33.2% 16.7% 80.0% 
2002 8.8% 24.6% 12.4% 52.0% 
2003 10.6% 21.6%* 15.0% 37.8%* 
 
 *The figures for Yukos in 2003 are calculated through September 2003 and are based on an un-audited interim 
report.  
 
Notes: Return on assets (non-current assets) in year is net income at the end of the year t divided by the average 
value of assets (non-current assets) on December 31 of year t and year t-1. Non-current assets equity include (most 
importantly) the net value of property, plant and equipment; it also includes equity investees and long-term 
investments at cost, deferred income tax assets and other long term assets.   
 Sources: For Yukos, see http://www.yukos.com/New_IR/Financial_reports.asp
 and http://www.yukos.com/New_IR/Financial_reports_archive.asp and download the YUKOS Oil Company U.S. 
GAAP Consolidated Financial Statements, from December 31, 2002, December 31, 2001, and December 31, 2000 . 
We also used (for 2003) the YUKOS Oil Company U.S. GAAP Interim Condensed Consolidated Financial 
Statement Setpember 30, 2003, which is an un-audited report that covers the first nine months of 2003. For LUKoil 
see http://www.lukoil.com/static_6_5id_210_.html and download the OAO LUKOIL Consolidated Financial 
Statements (prepared in accordance with US GAAP) As of December 31, 2002 and 2001; As of December 31, 2000 
and 1999 and for each of the years in the three year period ended December 31, 2000; and As of and for the years 
ended December 31, 1999 and 1998. 
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 Table 2.8.5 Exports of Crude Oil as Share of Production 
 
Mothers 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Rosneft 0.47 0.36 0.40 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.44 
LUKoil 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.36 
Surgutneftegas 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.34 
Yukos 0.26 0.25 0.44 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.34 
Sidanko 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.31 
Slavneft 0.24 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.32 
VNK 0.25 0.19 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Onako 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.07 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
TNK 0.16 0.21 0.31 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.38 
Sibneft 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.36 
Tatneft 0.24 0.12 0.31 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.38 
Bashneft 0.22 0.14 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.31 
KomiTEK 0.24 0.36 0.41 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Russneft  - - - - - - 0.41 
AVERAGE PER 
MOTHER 
0.27 0.21 0.33 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.36 
TOTAL 
MOTHERS 
0.27 0.20 0.33 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.35 
Notes: n.a. means that these companies do not exist in a particular year. 
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Table 2.8.6 Costs of Export Routes for Russian Oil Producers, 2003 
 
Port/Route 
Pipeline Route to 
Port/Refinery 
Average Transit Tariff  
($ per ton/km) 
Port Transshipment Tariff 
($ per ton) 
Capacity of 
the 
Route/Port 
(mln tons per 
year) 
Druzhba 
 (till Russian 
border) 
Russia  .331 - 626 
Novorossyisk Russia .331 22 45.37 
Primorsk Russia .331 n/a 308 
Tuapse Russia .331 2.42 209 
.331 
 
Odessa 
Russia-
Ukraine 
Through Russia: 
Through Ukraine:   
Average Tariff : 
.441 
.39 
 
n/a 2410 
Yuzhnyi 
Russia-
Ukraine 
Through Russia: 
Through Ukraine:   
Source:   1 Transneft, 2002. 
               2 Marine Tariff Center. http://www.russianports.ru/novo/Tarif/35_p.htm;  
                                                     http://www.russianports.ru/tuap/Tarif/52_p.htm
               3 Oil and Capital, 2000. 
               4 Ventspils Nafta, 2000. 
               5  Caspian Energy, 2003. 
 6 Energy Information Administration, 2005. 
 7 Oil and Capital, 2003a. 
 8 Transneft, 2003. 
  9 Oil and Capital, 2003b. 
 10 Odessa Matine Port. http://www.port.odessa.ua/od199.php  
 11 Oil and Capital, 2002. 
 12 Mazeikiu Nafta.  http://www.nafta.lt/en/content.php?pid=18
 
 
Average Tariff : 
.331 
.441 
.39 
 
3.55 n/a 
.331 Through Russia: 
Russia-
Byelorussia-
Lithuania-
Latvia 
.643 Through Byelorussia:  
.9 3 4.74 5011 Ventspils Through Lithuania:   
.6 3 Through Latvia:          
.62 Average Tariff : 
 
Through Russia: 
Through Byelorussia:  
Through Latvia:          
Through Lithuania:   
Average Tariff : 
.331 
.641 
.711 Butinge 
Russia-
Byelorussia- 
Latvia- 
Lithuania 
.991 
.67 
 
n/a 1412 
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Table 2.8.7  Oil Exports in State-Independent and State-Influence Subsidiaries  
Dependent Variable Is Tons (000s) of Oil Exported by Route and Subsidiary in 2003 
 
Specification 1 Specification 2 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Independent 
Variables  State-
Influence 
Net of State-
Independent 
State-
Independent 
State-
Influence 
 State-
Influence 
Net of State-
Independent 
State-
Independent 
State-
Influence 
Regional 
Costs 
 
-2.37 
(1.581) 
-773.40 
0.42 
(1.558)   
138.26 
-1.95** 
(0.537) 
-631.57 
-2.40 
(1.623) 
-780.52 
0.37 
(1.599)  
121.07 
-2.02** 
(0.544) 
-655 
Transport 
Costs for 
Pipeline 
Route 
-3.39**    
 (0.976) 
-2540.51 
1.34    
(0.846) 
1004.02 
-2.05** 
(0.539) 
-1525.56 
-3.71**  
(1.017) 
-2783.79 
1.61* 
(0.867) 
1204.60 
-2.10** 
(0.544) 
-1565 
Pipeline 
Route 
Capacity 
263.89** 
(77.598) 
80.32** 
(27.159) 
1669.22 
344.20** 
(94.67) 
7152.29 
309.87** 90.21** 
(86.552) (28.684) 
 5485.40 6439.97 1874.86 
400.08** 
(104.918)  
8314 
Productivity 
-22.26** 
(6.068) 
-2012..08 
22.28** 
(5.894) 
2013.36 
0.01* 
(1.25) 
1.29 
-19.13** 
(5.486) 
-1743.33 
19.20** 
(5.299) 
0.07 
(1.254) 
1740.98 6.4 
Additional 
Controls 
Total wells, five pipeline routes and the 
eleven mothers 
Operating wells, five pipeline routes and the 
eleven mothers 
Log 
Pseudolikeli-
hood 
-1153.54 -1153.91 
Notes: Results are base on a maximum likelihood estimation of a Tobit model where the dependent variable is 
censored at zero. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. There are 270 observations and ** denotes 
significance at the 5-% level and * denotes significance at the 10-% level. Productivity is output per well in 
Specification 1 and output per operating well in Specification 2. 
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Table 2.8.8 Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
Regional 
Production 
Costs 
Number of 
Wells 
Number of 
Producing 
Wells 
Production 
per Well 
Production 
per 
Producing 
Well 
Transportation 
costs -0.30 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 
Route Capacity 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
 
Table 2.8.9 Oil Exports in State-Independent and State-Influence Subsidiaries, 1997 and 2003  
Dependent Variable Is Tons (000s) of Oil Exported by Route and Subsidiary  
2003 1997 
Independent 
Variables  State-Independent 
State-
Influence 
Net of State-
Independent 
State-
Independent 
State-
Influence 
Net of State-
Independent 
Total Wells 
(100s) 
67.35** -37.29** 
(17.6) 
47.62*    -38.26     
(28.3) (17.7) (28.3) 
Operating Wells 
X X X X 
 
Regional Costs -1.34 0.36 48.04 -44.88 
 (1.037)   (1.114) (74.98) (75.01) 
Productivity 18.95** -18.63** 
 (5.482) (5.750) 
-60.97 
(249.47) 
74.82 
(293.15) 
Additional 
Controls 
Five pipeline route used by mothers 
including Druzhba, 
Tuapse&Novorossiysk, Odessa, 
Butinge and Primorsk, differentiated 
by state-independent and state-
influence companies; eleven mothers 
Five pipeline route used by mothers 
including Druzhba, 
Tuapse&Novorossiysk, Odessa, 
Butinge and Primorsk, differentiated 
by state-independent and state-
influence companies; eleven 
mothers 
Log 
Psuedolikelihood -1160.74 -533.30 
Notes: Results are based on a maximum likelihood estimation of a Tobit model where the non-negative 
dependent variable is censored at zero. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. There are 270 
observations for 2003 and 108 observations for 1997. ** denotes significance at the 5-% level and * denotes 
significance at the 10-% level. Productivity is output per well.  
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Figure 2.8.1 Export Routes for Russian Crude Oil 
 
CODE 
1: Primorsk 5, 6: Odessa, Yuzhnyi 
2: Ventspils 7: Novorossyisk 
3: Butinge 8: Tuapse 
4: Druzhba   
 
3.0  ESSAY TWO  
CASPIAN OIL BOOM:  
INFORMATIONAL HERDING AMONG THE OIL COMPANIES 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-1990s, the Caspian region7, especially the states of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 
managed to generate a great deal of excitement around wildcat exploration of its poorly 
researched oil and gas fields. In a short period of time, 1997-1998, an extraordinary volume of 
international investment poured into the region. However, this hype was soon over. In early 
1999, several oil development projects were closed, some companies exited contract negotiations 
without picking up a project and no new oil companies signed contracts despite the availability 
of potential oil-bearing structures.  This massive entry and exit of investment in the region is 
hard to explain: it could not have been caused by the size of the available reserves, which was 
quite uncertain and insignificant in comparison to other oil regions in the world; it was 
countercyclical to the movement of oil prices and, as we will document, is not likely to have 
been caused by the developments in the legal environment in the region. In this essay we argue 
that the Caspian oil boom story may be consistent with informational herding: despite weak and 
                                                 
7 The Caspian region (namely, the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) is 
defined by geology, i.e. location of conformed oil and gas reserves in particular, rather than demography. 
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noisy private information on the available Caspian reserves, the international investment started 
coming to the region after strong public signals on the Caspian potential were released. 
Similarly, the investment stopped after negative public information about the size of the Caspian 
reserves became available.   
It is straightforward to document the Caspian oil boom. The massive investment inflow in 
the Caspian oil in mid-1990s was often called “the global rush to explore” (Coll for The 
Washington Post, 1993), "the last great oil rush of the 20th century" (Ottaway and Morgan for 
The Washington Post, 1997), “a nasty case of resource fever” (The Economist, 1998) and "the 
Great Game" (Raff for The Wall Street Journal, 2004). As Figure 3.5.1 shows, by 1999 over 20 
oil exploration contracts were signed in Azerbaijan alone. Most of the projects were created in 
1997-1998: 5 and 7 new contracts signed in 1997 and 1998, respectively. By 1998, these 
contracts represented over $30 billion in long-term capital investment with some $2.5 billion in 
sunk and committed investment (International Energy Agency, 1998; International Energy 
Agency, 2000).  On the other hand, direct foreign investment in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sectors 
were about $2 bln for 1991-1996 with $410 mnl invested in 1996 alone (International Energy 
Agency, 1998).  
What is also surprising is that at the end of the 1990s this interest in Caspian oil died, and 
“the last great oil rush” turned into “oil-rush euphoria evaporated” (The Economist, 1999). 
Again, according to Figure 3.5.1, after 1999 almost no new projects were picked up despite the 
fact that there were over 200 identified potential oil structures – only 2 new contracts were 
signed in 1999 and 1 in 2000. Moreover, two oil companies, Arco and Conoco, decided to exit 
the country after long negotiations without picking up a contract 
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Further evidence of the oil boom is the extent to which the foreign companies became 
involved in the Caspian oil sector. The spike of investment activity among the oil companies was 
especially vivid in Azerbaijan. As shown on Figures 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, direct investment of oil 
companies grew from $0 to $845 million between 1994 and 1997, bringing total direct and 
portfolio investment in the country to $1.1 billion in 1997 alone (IMF, 2000) . Gross private 
capital flows as percent of Azeri GDP increased from 14.6% in 1995 to 28.8% in 1997 (The 
World Bank, 2004).  However, after reaching its peak in 1997, the foreign direct investment fell 
to only $119 million as well as private capital flows decreased drastically to 3% of GDP in 2000. 
International creditors also rapidly entered the Caspian states during 1997-1998. Figure 
3.5.4 documents that the total commitments of official and private creditors grew from $40.5 
million in 1996 to $374.1 million in 1998 in Azerbaijan, and from $414 million in 1994 to over 
$1 billion in 1997 in Kazakhstan. Increasing investment appears to have contributed to the faster 
capital formation and development of the communication infrastructure, as seen from Figures 
3.5.5 and 3.5.6. In 1995-1998, the gross capital formation in Azerbaijan grew from $726 million 
to $1.2 billion. The number of Azeri phone mainlines and cell phone users per 1000 people 
stayed almost constant in 1994-1995 (85 mainlines per 1000 people and 0 cell phone users per 
1000 people), but started growing rapidly in 1996-1999. By 1999 the number of mainlines 
increased by 10 and became 95 per 1000 people; the number of cell phone users became almost 
50 per 1000 people. 
However, again, the creditors’ hype about the region subsided quite drastically after 
1999, when their commitments fell to $215 million in Azerbaijan and $665.9 million in 
Kazakhstan by the year 2000. Also, the gross capital formation in Azerbaijan decreased from 
well over $1 billion in 1998 to about $900 million in 2000. The growth of infrastructure slowed 
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down: by 2000 the number of mainlines increased only by 7 per 1000 people and the number of 
cell phone users stayed almost unchanged.  
More evidence of the Caspian boom can be found in the international media. As Figure 
3.5.7 shows, media reports on the region increased drastically in 1997-1998. In 1994, all major 
international news sources (e.g., The Economist, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal 
and The Washington Post) reported only one story on the region: the signing of the first mega-
deal, “the contract of the century”, in Azerbaijan. However, in 1997 The Washington Post 
published 12 stories on Caspian international projects development, pipeline issues and Russian 
involvement in the region; The New York Times and The Washington Post published 8 stories 
each on the Caspian issues in 1998. Yet again, the media interest in the region died soon after. In 
2000 there were only 4 Caspian stories published in The Wall Street Journal, 2 in the 
Washington Post, 1 in The Economist and The New York Times did not write about Caspian oil 
at all.  
Thus, there is a great deal of evidence of the Caspian oil boom: it appears that there was a 
rapid entry of international investors in the region during 1997 and 1998, but by 1999 the interest 
in the Caspian oil was lost. However, what is not that straightforward is how to explain this 
dynamics of Caspian frenzy among the investors and media.  First, the size of the Caspian 
proven reserves was not significant enough to attract such a massive investment flow in such a 
short period of time. According to Figure 3.5.8, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan’s proven oil reserves 
were 3.6 and 10 billion barrels respectively, which is much smaller than, let’s say, Russia’s 56 
billion barrels or Venezuela’s 74.9 billion barrels or Saudi Arabia’s 261.5 billion barrels (US 
Department of State, 1997; BP, 2005).  
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Second, the size of the potential Caspian reserves was quite uncertain for prospective 
investors. The estimates of the upper bound of the possible Caspian reserves varied from 13.2 
billion barrels of undiscovered reserves in Azerbaijan by the US Department of the Interior (US 
Department of Interior, 1982) to 27 billion barrels of possible reserves in Azerbaijan only and a 
probable 178 billion barrels in the whole region by the US State Department (US Department of 
State, 1997). Most of the researchers, however, were comfortable with more conservative 
estimates projecting that the Caspian would never become “the second Middle East” and was 
more likely to be comparable in its importance with the North Sea (Bahgat, 2003; Gregory, 
2000; Skagen, 2000). 
Third, usually the spike of oil exploration investment happens when the oil prices are 
relatively high and rising. However, as it is seen from Figure 3.5.9, the world oil prices were 
actually falling when the majority of oil companies entered the Caspian wildcat exploration 
projects in 1997-1998. By the time the oil prices recovered in 2000, the Caspian frenzy died.  
Fourth, in order to draw international oil companies to the region, the Caspian states 
offered the contracts with very attractive terms and made sure that the legal environment became 
more stable for the investors. According to Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey developed by the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
by 1999 most of the survey respondents reported that the local legal systems would uphold 
contract and property rights. However, starting in April 1999, no new companies were willing to 
sign contracts in the region.  
The above analysis suggests that the Caspian oil boom may not be consistent with the 
obvious explanations: the size of the region’s recoverable reserves was not enough to cause a 
huge influx of investors’ interest; the oil companies were not reacting to the dynamics of the oil 
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prices; and the legal environment in the region could not be the cause of the investors’ lost 
interest in the Caspian oil.  
However, there is another possible explanation is consistent with the spike of investment 
activity in the Caspian. The dynamics of the Caspian frenzy may be explained by informational 
herding. A lot of investors could have come to the Caspian region as a part of the herd that was 
created by informational externalities and available public information. Informational 
externalities were provided to the potential investors by observable decisions of the companies 
that first had come to the region: every investment decision revealed a little bit of the company’s 
private information. Hence, every potential investor could have used this additional piece of 
information in making a decision. Also, all potential Caspian investors had access to credible 
public information on Caspian reserves 
There are two important factors that make informational herding relevant to the Caspian 
oil boom. First, public information releases and informational externalities are important in oil 
exploration. Very often the tracts within an oil region may be located over a common oil pool or 
have similar geological characteristics. In both cases, the values of nearby tracts are correlated. 
Hence, the discovery of oil in a region is seen as a signal that there is more oil in nearby tracts. 
Similarly, a decision of an oil company to invest in the exploration of a tract (i.e., drill) also 
gives some insight into how promising was the company’s private information on the oil area. 
Thus, successful drillings as well as exploration works per se are informative signals that 
companies can benefit from when making their own investment decisions. 
Second, the investment and information environment in the Caspian in the mid-1990 was 
consistent with the setting where informational herds can occur. The companies invested in the 
Caspian fields sequentially; and some aspects of the investment environment were common 
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knowledge while others were known only to the specific companies. The common-knowledge 
factors included the number of contracts signed, location of the contracted tracts, the name of the 
companies involved in each project and the progress of work on each project. These factors 
provided information externalities to each company that was in the process of contract 
negotiations. The seismic information on specific tracts, on the other hand, was not available 
publicly. Each company considered seismic information on the tract of interest privately before 
making its decision.  
In this essay, we will present available evidence to argue that the Caspian oil boom is 
consistent with informational herding. Our strategy will be to eliminate obvious explanations for 
the investment spike, and provide direct and indirect evidence that supports the informational 
herding hypothesis. First, we will show that the Caspian oil boom is not consistent with the 
following explanations: it could not have been caused by the movement of oil prices, the sudden 
availability of new, abundant oil reserves, or by changes in the legal environment in the region. 
Then we will argue that under the available informational environment in the Caspian region it 
was quite possible for informational herding to occur and that informational herding caused a 
huge investment influx.  We will also argue that the herding was very fragile and was broken 
after negative public information about the region became available.  
One interpretation of the paper’s argument is that in order to minimize investment risk, 
the oil companies consider all of the available information, not just privately obtained but also 
publicly available information, including the investment decisions of other oil companies. 
However, this strategy of using maximum available information may not necessarily improve the 
companies’ decision. As it will be shown, in the case of the Caspian oil available public 
information was quite noisy and including it in the process of investment decision making could 
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not have been necessarily beneficial to the oil companies. Ex post, a company may have been 
better off by just considering its own private signal and not following the herd. 
This essay contributes to the literature that empirically investigates the presence of 
informational herds. Despite the fact that informational learning models are motivated by real-
life examples8, there are not that many papers that actually document the presence of 
informational herding in real life. One of the most recent empirical studies was done by Kennedy 
(2002), where the author showed the strong herding tendencies among the networks when they 
introduce prime-time television programs.  
The essay is structured as follows: section 3.2 argues that under the available investment 
environment the Caspian oil boom cannot be explained by oil prices, availability of new 
investment opportunities or changes in the legal system; section 3.3 develops a herding 
hypothesis; and section 3.4 concludes.  
 
3.2 CASPIAN OIL BOOM: POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
In this section, I will limit my discussion to investment in the Azerbaijani oil sector. As it has 
been mentioned in the Introduction, Azerbaijan is probably the best example of how the Caspian 
states were affected by the oil boom. There, the massive inflow and consequent outflow of oil 
investment was most vividly observed. Hence, evidence from the Azeri oil sector will be most 
helpful in describing Caspian oil boom.   
                                                 
8 E.g., Bikhchadani, Hirshlefier and Welch (1992) motivate their model by observing fads and different fashion 
trends; Avery and Zemsky (1998) develop an informational herding model to explain conforming behavior in 
financial markets.    
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It is important to emphasize that the Azeri government adopted a very cautious 
mechanism of contracting off oil fields: tracts were offered either individually or in small groups 
at different time periods to a particular oil company; each contract individually negotiated. To 
guarantee the legal stability of investment with each contract was ratified by the Parliament 
thereby gaining legal status. There were no entry barriers for the oil companies: they just had to 
be offered an oil field by the Azerbaijani government for a potential development project. Since 
Azerbaijan saw its oil reserves as the main force behind its fast economic development, the 
government did not have any incentive to limit oil companies’ participation in the Azeri oil 
sector.  
Under such an investment environment, there may be several possible explanations that 
can justify the Caspian oil boom. The oil companies could have started coming and investing in 
the region because oil prices were on the rise; because they recognized that the newly-opened 
Caspian reserves were the best investment opportunities at the time; and because the legal system 
created enough incentives for investors to come in. In this subsection, we will discuss whether 
the Caspian oil boom can be explained by changes in oil market prices, by the availability of new 
oil resources for international development and by changes in the legal environment.  
 
3.2.1 Change in Oil Market Prices 
Higher oil market prices make expensive investment in wildcat exploration more attractive. 
Hence, as long as oil prices are growing, companies will invest more in poorly explored oil 
regions. As soon as oil prices fall, however, companies will decrease their investment in the 
exploration of new oil regions and concentrate on oil production at old working fields.  
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Figure 3.5.9 shows the changes in price for the Russian Urals blend9 in 1994-2000. As it 
is seen from the graph, the Urals blend price was growing until early 1997; in 1997 and 1998 it 
was falling steadily; then in mid-1999 the price began recovering and grew till late 2000.   
The dynamics of the oil price changes is quite the opposite of the investment pattern in 
the Caspian. As it has been discussed in the introduction, most of the oil companies came to the 
region in 1997-1998, when the prices were falling, and stopped investing in the new oil fields in 
the region after 1999, when the oil prices were on the rise.  
There are two possible arguments that can explain investment into the exploration of the 
Caspian region when oil prices were falling. First, contract negotiations are long and costly. So, 
the decision of an oil company to enter into a contract may lag behind an oil price change. 
Second, the exploration investment becomes commercially unviable after the oil price hits a 
certain lower bound. So, as long as the price is above that level, a company will still choose to 
invest.  
Both of the arguments above also suggest that as soon as the price starts recovering, oil 
companies will increase their investment in the oil fields. However, even when in November, 
2000, the Urals blend price reached its highest point for 1994-2000 ($33.93 per barrel), no new 
contracts were signed in Azerbaijan. Hence, the Caspian oil boom cannot be entirely explained 
by the dynamics of world oil prices.  
 
                                                 
9 Most of the Caspian oil in 1994-2000 was shipped to the world markets through the Russian pipeline system, 
where it was blended with all of the oil currently in the pipeline. Hence, at the final export destination the Caspian 
oil was priced as the Russian Urals blend. The exceptions to this are exports from companies using the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium and Baku-Supsa pipeline through Georgia. This oil is typically priced closer to the Asian 
blends, which are a little more expensive than the Russian Urals blend. However, the change dynamics of the 
Russian Urals and Asian blends are usually similar.  
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3.2.2  Availability of New Oil Resources for International Development 
Oil is not a renewable resource; hence, oil companies are constantly looking for replacement of 
their work-out reserves. As soon as a new oil rich region opens up for international investment, 
oil companies will start acquiring tracts in that region.   
In mid-1990, oil production from the Alaskan North Slope and the North Sea was 
declining. However, most of the richest oil regions (e.g., Middle East countries) were either 
completely closed or offered limited opportunities to international investment, as can be seen 
from Figure 3.5.10. Thus, the opening up of the Caspian region for international development 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union provided oil companies with the best investment 
opportunities despite the fact that the Caspian was not as rich in oil as some other regions. 
According to one oil executive, there were “not a lot of Caspians out there” in 1998 (The 
Washington Post, 1998).  
By the same argument, the oil companies should have stopped acquiring oil tracts in the 
Caspian region after another, more promising region had opened up. However, in 1999-2000 it 
was not the case. There were no new oil discoveries or sudden new investment opportunities for 
oil companies to pursue. When Arco decided to close its office in Azerbaijan, its representative 
stated that the company planned to concentrate its activities in the regions that it was already 
involved – Alaska, China, Nigeria and the North Sea (Alexander’s Oil & Gas Connections, 
1999). Thus, the fall of investment in the Caspian region did not coincide with the sudden 
availability of new resources; and the Caspian oil boom cannot be entirely explained by the 
sudden availability of new oil resources to develop. 
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3.2.3 Change in Legal Environment 
A stable legal framework is important for oil companies when they make their investment 
decisions. Moreover, if the states in the region are able to offer contracts with more attractive 
terms than similar contracts in other oil regions, then the oil companies will have more incentives 
to come in. Similarly, if the states in the region change the terms of the contract to the investors’ 
disadvantage, then the oil companies will stop signing contracts in the region and move to the 
states that offer better contracts.  
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Caspian states occurred in a legal 
vacuum. In order to signal guaranteed legal protection and profitability of investments, 
Azerbaijan did two things. First, as it has been described in section 3.1, it adopted an ad hoc legal 
strategy. Each contract was considered individually and ratified by the Parliament, thereby 
solidifying its legal status. Second, to make Azeri oil tracts more attractive, the terms of the 
contracts offered were much more attractive than the terms of similar contracts in other oil 
regions. Table 3.5.1 compares Azeri contracts to similar agreements in other regions. As it is 
seen from the table, Azeri contracts did not require royalty payments and the tax rate on profit oil 
was much lower than similar taxes in other regions.  
It would be expected that the oil companies would stop coming to a region if the legal 
environment became unstable and/or the government started offering less attractive contracts. 
This was not the case in Azerbaijan. In 1994-2000, Azerbaijan had the same President; the State 
Oil Company of Azerbaijan was led by the same person as well, and there were no changes in 
the legal procedures of the adoption of contracts. The terms of the contracts offered also did not 
change much. Moreover, according to The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey developed by the World Bank and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 
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in 1999, 69.2% of respondents agreed that the Azeri legal system would uphold contract and 
property rights; while only 44.9% of respondents agreed that the contracts and property rights 
had been honored three years before, in 1996, and 30.1% of respondents noted that the notion of 
protected property rights did not exist in 1996 (The World Bank, 1999). This implies that the 
legal protection of investors in Azerbaijan was better in 1999 than in 1996. The above analysis 
suggests that the decrease in oil investment in the Caspian region was not caused by the change 
in the region’s legal environment; and the Caspian oil boom is not fully consistent with the 
change in legal environment explanation.  
3.3 CASPIAN OIL BOOM: INFORMATIONAL HERDING 
The previous section argues that the Caspian oil boom cannot be explained by the most obvious 
hypotheses: it was countercyclical to oil prices dynamics, was not consistent with the availability 
of reserves and could not be predicted by the developments of the legal system in the Caspian 
states.  
There is another possible explanation that may help us tell the story of the Caspian oil 
boom. In 1997-1998, the investors could have been following the informational herd, i.e. 
investing in the region despite weak positive or simply poor available information. The 
investment stopped coming to the region when the herd was broken by a strong release of 
information that contradicted the investment decision of the herd.  
The phenomenon of informational herding was first discussed independently by Banerjee 
(1992) and Bikhandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), and further developed by Smith and 
Sorensen (2000). The authors describe an economy with exogenously ordered Bayesian agents 
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who sequentially make once-in-a-life-time investment decision under incomplete and 
asymmetric information. Each individual receives a private signal conditioned on the state of the 
world and can observe the actions of the agents before her. Since every agent uses her private 
information to choose a profit-maximizing action, each individual’s decision reveals some 
information about her private signal. Therefore, if return for each decision is uncertain and an 
agent’s choice reveals some of her private information, then the next agents can free-ride on this 
additional piece of information to improve their decisions. Put differently, an observable decision 
provides so called “information externality” for the next individuals in line.  
The main conclusion of the model is that because of the information externality 
eventually the informational herd starts: after a finite number of agents, we observe that every 
individual makes the same decision as her predecessor, even if her private signal only weakly 
supports the decision of the herd or even contradicts it.  
This conformity in actions is caused by the convergence of agents’ beliefs. So, any 
information that can affect the beliefs of the agents can either reinforce or break the herd. We 
will observe the conformity in agents’ decisions faster if there is a release of public information 
that supports the investment decisions of the earlier individuals. Similarly, the informational herd 
will be broken if the public information release refutes the decision of the herd.  
As it has been discussed in section 3.1, the investment and information environment in 
Azerbaijan is consistent with the setting where informational herds can occur. First, 
informational externalities are important in oil exploration since the oil fields can be located on 
top of a common deposit or have similar geological characteristics as a field where the oil is 
discovered. In both cases, the value of neighboring tracts is correlated. Second, the oil companies 
invested in the Azeri fields sequentially. Companies were randomly invited by the Azeri 
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governments to negotiate an oil development contract. Each contract signed included a so-called 
“minimum exploration program” clause. This clause obliged the company to conduct a detailed 
seismic analysis of the area, and drill several exploratory wells within a certain period or pay a 
fine if the minimum exploration was not finished on time. Thus, when entering a contract, the 
company was actually committing to exploration investment on the tract. 
Third, the informational environment had common-knowledge, public information as 
well as private signals. The common-knowledge factors included the number of contracts signed 
location of the contracted tracts, the name of the companies involved in each projects and 
progress of work there. This information was almost instantly distributed through media or 
company press releases. These factors provided information externality to each company that 
was in the process of contract negotiations.  
In contrast, the seismic information on specific tracts was not available publicly. Before 
signing a contract, the oil company would receive some seismic information about the tract it had 
been offered. Most often, it was a high-quality two-dimensional seismic survey of the area done 
by the local research institutes. Once in possession of the data, the company could not resell it to 
any other party10.  
Using the conclusions of the informational herding models, we can formulate the 
following hypothesis:  
 
The massive investment started coming to the Caspian region after enough public information 
indicated that the investment decisions made by the first companies would pay off. The 
                                                 
10 We thank Dr Parviz Mamedov, Chair of the Department of Geophysics at Azerbaijan Oil Academy, for help 
with this issue. 
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investment stopped coming to the region after public information revealed that investment in the 
Caspian region was not profitable. 
 
In other words, we would observe a massive influx of investment after strong, credible 
public information about the first contract areas and the region’s reserves in general became 
available. We should also observe that some of the oil companies decided to enter projects even 
with a rather weak positive private signal about their contract areas. We should also expect few 
contracts signed after credible negative information about the Caspian reserves was released.  
To see whether the Caspian oil boom is consistent with the above hypothesis, we 
constructed Tables 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. Table 3.5.2 documents major news releases in 1994-2000 as 
published in companies’ press releases as well as in selected expert reports and from 
international media outlets. We used reports prepared by the Information Energy Agency and the 
U.S. Department of State. We looked through The Economist, The New York Times, The Wall 
Street Journal, The Washington Post as well as Caspian Business Report11 and Alexander’s 
Gas & Oil Connections12 when surveying the international media outlets. Table 3.5.3 provides 
information on each contract signed in Azerbaijan in 1994-2000: the name of the tract, when it 
was contracted off, which oil company signed the contract as well as the size of the signature 
bonus, the amount of total projected investment and the estimated reserve size.  
As table 3.5.2 shows, in 1994-1996 there was only one big news release on Caspian oil: 
the international media reported that the first production-sharing agreement on the Azeri-Chirag-
Deepwater Guneshli mega-structure was signed by international majors. In this period very few 
                                                 
11 Biweekly market intelligence report on the Caspian Region prepared by U.S.-Azerbaijan Council, a U.S.-
based non-partisan, non-profit organization. 
12 A website that surveys major news sources for information on the global gas, oil, power and affiliated 
industries.  
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new contracts appeared in Azerbaijan. Only production-sharing agreement was signed in 1995 
and two more appeared in 1996.   
The influx of positive news about the Caspian oil reserves is observed in 1997-1998. In 
April 1997, the U.S. Department of State released information about huge estimates (up to 178 
billion barrels) of possible oil reserves in the region. Later this year, in November 1997, BP 
reported the beginning of oil production and export from an Azeri field. In early 1998, reports 
appeared on more negotiations in progress between the international oil companies and the Azeri 
government. In the period of 1997-1998, we observe a dramatic increase in contracts signed: 5 
new production-sharing agreements were created in 1997 and 7 more were signed in 1998. 
The first negative news about the Caspian reserves came in late 1998. In October 1998, 
the reports on dry wells drilled appeared in the media. These stories were confirmed in early 
1999, when in February and April 1999, respectively, two Azeri contracts were closed. This 
news was followed by reports of the international companies exiting renegotiations in Azerbaijan 
without signing a contract. In July and November, 1999, Arco and Conoco respectively released 
their decision to leave Azerbaijan. After 1999, no major news on the Caspian oil reserve was 
published. In the period of 1999-2000, we observe the drastic decrease in the contracts signed for 
Azeri fields; there were only 3 production-sharing agreements created in 1999 and only 1 
appeared in 2000.    
The above analysis shows that the dynamics of investment in the Azerbaijani oil fields 
follows the release of information: most of the companies came to the region after an influx of 
positive news about the first projects signed and the region’s oil reserves in general. The 
investment stopped coming to the region after bad public news arrived. Such a pattern of investor 
behavior is consistent with the informational herding hypothesis.  
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The further consistency of the Caspian oil boom with informational herding can be seen 
from Table 3.5.3. This table provides some insights into the private information available to oil 
companies before they signed contracts. The signature bonuses reported in the table give us some 
idea about the companies’ beliefs about the success of the project. The bonus is negotiated before 
the contract is signed, and is typically paid to the government of Azerbaijan within 30 days of the 
contract going into effect. The size of the bonus positively depends on the expected reserves and 
the probability of getting them. Projected investment per barrel of estimated reserves (calculated 
as amount of total projected investment over the estimated reserves) can give us an idea on how 
expensive the project was expected to be for the company.  
It is seen from Table 3.5.3 that the signature bonuses for the tracts contracted off in 1997-
1998 are smaller, on average, than the signature bonuses paid by the first companies: $150 
million paid by BP and Amoco in 1994 as opposed to $10 million per project paid by most of the 
companies in 1997-1998. This suggests that the private information of the companies that signed 
contracts in 1997-1998 was weaker than the private information received by the first companies. 
The poorer private information received by the later companies is explained by the fact that most 
of the later contracts involved wildcat exploration of the tracts. On the other hand, the area of the 
first contract (Azeri, Chirag and Deepwater Gunieshli) was thoroughly drilled and explored. The 
mega-structure was discovered by Soviet geologists in the 1980s and was extensively studied; 
however, full production of the fields was not possible thensince the Soviet Union did not have 
the necessary drilling technology. 
The contracts signed in 1997-1998 also appear to be more expensive than the first ones: 
$0.91-$5.33 per expected barrel in 1997-1998 compared to $1.20-$2.41 in 1994-1996. This 
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suggests that the companies that came to Azerbaijan in 1997-1998 were eager to undertake more 
expensive projects despite poorer private signals.  
The analysis of Table 3.5.3 also suggests that the oil companies’ decisions to invest in 
Azeri fields are consistent with informational herd behavior. Most of the companies that signed 
contracts in 1997-1998 did so despite weak private information.  
Recall that informational herding is caused by the conformity in the agents’ beliefs. 
Indirect evidence of the convergence of oil companies’ expectations, despite available weak 
private information, can be found in the reports of the journalists who were stationed in 
Azerbaijan at the time. Before 1997, there were not so many oil companies’ officials who would 
go on the record to discuss Caspian oil reserve potential. This, however, changed in 1997 and 
1998. According to Morgan and Ottaway (The Washington Post, 1997), a consultant for 
Pennenergy claimed that the Caspian was “a huge pool of oil”; Hamilton (The Washington Post, 
1998) quoted the president for international exploration of Mobil Corp. who compared Caspian 
potential to “the Middle East back in the 1930s and 1940s”. Copper and Pope (The Wall Street 
Journal, 1998) talked to the world-wide exploration chief of the Phillips Petroleum Co. and 
spokesman of Oryx Energy Co., who claimed that the Caspian was “a premier area in 
discovering new reserves”. 
We can also indirectly document the change in the companies’ expectations of the 
Caspian reserves after the bad news started arriving in early 1999. The Economist in March, 
1999, reported that a lot of businessmen were leaving the country because they were “just tired 
of pouring money into a black hole”; Kinzer (The New York Times, 1999) noted that the 
Caspian enthusiasm was tempered by “a few dry holes and pullouts by several companies.”  
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
This paper suggests that the investment boom in the Caspian region may be consistent 
with informational herding. The Caspian oil boom was preceded by releases of positive 
information about the Caspian reserves as well as good news about the development of some 
tracts. The boom died after the news of the dry holes had been released as well as after several 
companies decided to leave the region without signing a contract. Given the sequential nature of 
contract negotiations as well as the presence of information externalities in the region, this 
behavior of investors fits the predictions of informational herding models. Companies tend to 
make the same investment decision despite their weak private signals as long as this decision is 
supported by both the choices of their predecessors and publicly available information. However, 
as soon as some company deviates and/or strong public information contradicting the herding 
decision arrives, conformity is broken.  
Our findings imply that in order to minimize investment risk, the oil companies 
considered all of the available information: both privately obtained and publicly available, 
including the investment decisions of other oil companies. However, does this strategy of using 
all available information improve a company’s decision? The latest development of the contracts 
signed in 1997-1998 suggests that it does not. Out of twelve contracts signed in Azerbaijan in 
1997-1998, three are closed and drillings in another four revealed no oil.  
This suggests that there should be a better mechanism of information disclosure between 
the companies in oil exploration. 
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Figure 3.5.1 Number of Contracts Signed in Azerbaijan in a Given Year, 1994-2000 
 
 62 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
m
ln
 U
S
$
Total 
Oil Companies
 
Figure 3.5.2 Direct and Portfolio Investment in Azerbaijan, 1994-2000, Million $ 
Source: IMF 
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Figure 3.5.3 Gross Private Capital Flows in Azerbaijan as % of GDP, 1995-2000 
Source: WB 
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Figure 3.5.4 Commitments of Creditors in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 1994-2000, Million $ 
Source: WB 
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Figure 3.5.5 Gross Capital Formation in Azerbaijan, 1995-2000, Constant 1995 Million $ 
Source: WB 
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Figure 3.5.6 Development of Communication Infrastructure in Azerbaijan, 1994-2000 
Source: WB 
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Figure 3.5.7 Number of Major Publications on Caspian Issues  
in Selected International Media Sources in a Given Year, 1994-2000 
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Figure 3.5.8 Oil: Proven Reserves, 1998, Thousand Million Barrels 
Source: BP 
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Figure 3.5.9 Mediterranean Russian Urals Spot Price FOB13, 1994-2000, 
 $ per Barrel; 1994-1996 Annually; 1997-2000 Weekly 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2006 
                                                 
13 Free on Board is defined as: A sales transaction in which the seller makes the product available for pick up at a 
specified port or terminal at a specified price and the buyer pays for the subsequent transportation and insurance. We 
are grateful to Larry Alverson of Weekly Petroleum Status Report, Energy Information Administration, for help 
with this issue 
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Figure 3.5.10 Access to Proven Petroleum Reserves, 1998, Billion Barrels of Oil Equivalent 
Source: BP, 2004; Nanay, 2000  
Table 3.5.1 Comparison of Contract Terms in Different Oil Producing Regions 
 
Country Signature Bonus Royalty Rate Profit Oil Tax Rate 
Azerbaijan Yes 0 
0 
yes; may reach 20% 
0 
5.5% 
25%-32% 
Angola 
Average African PSA 
India 
Average Asian PSA 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
50% 
50% 
50% 
41% 
Source: Bindemann, 1999; texts of the contracts 
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Table 3.5.2 Major News Releases on Developments in Azeri Oil Sector and Contracts Signed, 
1994-2000 
 
Year News Release News Source 
# of Contracts 
Signed in a 
Given Year 
1994 
Sept, 1994: BP and Amoco 
signed the first production 
sharing agreement in 
Azerbaijan, Azeri, Chirag and 
Deepwater Guneshli 
The New York Times 
The Wall Street Journal 
The Economist 
1 
1995 -- -- 1 
1996 -- -- 2 
April, 1997: U.S. Department 
of State releases high 
estimates of the Caspian 
reserves (up to 178 billion 
barrels) 
U.S. Department of Sate 
The Wall Street Journal 
1997 
Nov, 1997: BP starts 
production and export of oil 
from Chirag field 
BP check the source 
5 
Spring 1998: Reports on 
concessions in working, 
including negotiations with 
Arco and Conoco 
International Energy Agency 
Caspian Business Report 
April, 1998; Oct, 1998: 
Reports that the Caspian 
reserves may have been 
exaggerated 
The Washington Post 
 
7 1998 
Oct, 1998: Reports on dry 
wells drilled in Azeri fields The Wall Street Journal 
Feb, 1999: Karabakh project 
officially became non-
operational 
SOCAR 
April, 1999: Dan Ulduzu-
Ashrafi project was officially 
closed  
SOCAR 
July, 1999: Arco leaves 
Azerbaijan 
Alexander’s Gas & Oil 
Connections 
1999 
November, 1999: Conoco 
leaves Azerbaijan 
Alexander’s Gas & Oil 
Connections 
3 
2000 -- -- 1 
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Table 3.5.3 Production Sharing Agreements in Azerbaijan, 1994-2000 
 
# Tracts Year Company 
Signature 
Bonus 
(million $) 
Estimated 
Reserves 
(billion 
barrels) 
Projected 
Investment 
(billion $) 
Projected 
Investment 
per Barrel 
($) 
1 
Azeri, Chirag, 
and   
Deepwater 
Gunashli 
Sept 
1994 
BP 
Amoco 150
3 5.41 131 2.41 
2 Karabakh Nov 1995 Pennenergy 8
3 .882 1.52 1.70 
3 Shakh-Deniz June 1996 BP 37
3 2.51 31 1.20 
4 Dan Ulduzu-Ashrafi 
Dec 
1996 Amoco 8
3 12 22 2.00 
5 Lankaran-Talysh Deniz 
Jan 
1997 Elf 10 .70
1 21 2.86 
6 Yalama July 1997 Lukoil n/a .75
1 2.5-5.51 3.33 
7 Absheron Aug 1997 Chevron 10 .86
1 3.51 4.07 
8 Oguz Aug 1997 Mobil 10 .73 2 2.74 
9 Nakhichevan Aug 1997 Exxon 10 .75
1 21 2.67 
10 Kurdashi-Araz-Kirgan 
June 
1998 Eni 32 .73
1 2.51 3.42 
11 Genubi-Garbi Gobustan 
June 
1998 
Commonwealth 
of Oil and Gas n/a .15
2 .82 5.33 
12 Inam July 1998 Amoco 32 2.2
1 21 0.91 
13 Ahikh (Araz-Alov-Sharg) 
July 
1998 Amoco 10 4
1 101 2.50 
14 Muradkhanli-Jafarli-Zardab 
July 
1998 Ramco n/a .73
1 11 1.37 
15 Kursangi-Garabagly 
Dec 
1998 Frontera n/a .73
1 11 1.37 
16 Atashgan Dec 1998 
Japan-Azerbaijan 
Oil Company 10 .6
1 2.31 3.83 
Padar-
Kharami 
Apr 
1999 17 Moncrief n/a .58-.75
1 .141 0.24 
Lerik-Lenab-
Savalan-Dalga 
Apr 
1999 18 Mobil n/a 1
1 31 3.00 
19 Zafar-Mashal Apr 1999 Exxon 75
3 1-21 31 3.00 
20 Zukh-Govsany June 2000 Lukoil n/a .06-.15
1 .251 4.17 
 
1 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2004 
2 Bisnis, 1999 
3 As stated in the contract 
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4.0  ESSAY THREE  
QUALITY OF INFORMATION, INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES AND 
SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS OF OIL COMPANIES 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-1990, the Caspian region managed to attract a great deal of investment in wildcat 
exploration of its oil and gas fields. This interest in the Caspian oil  was often called "the great 
oil rush of the 20th century" (Ottaway and Morgan for The Washington Post, 1997) and "the 
Great Game" (Raff for The Wall Street Journal, 2004). However, some experts questioned the 
size of investment. Despite the fact that there was no agreement on the upper bound of the 
possible reserves, most of the researches were comfortable with more conservative estimates 
(U.S. Department of Interior, 1982; U.S. Department of State, 1997; Bahgat, 2003; Gregory, 
2000; Skagen, 2000). Moreover, ex post some of the observers started calling investment in the 
Caspian "pouring money into a black hole" (The Economist, 1999). 
So, what determines oil companies' decision to invest in a poorly explored oil region? In 
this essay, we argue that the oil companies tend to invest more in unexplored fields when 
information externalities are important, the decision-making is sequential and available public 
and private information is noisy. 
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We attempt to explain investment decisions of oil companies using social learning 
framework. In particular, we model investment of oil companies as sequential decisions to invest 
in projects of unknown value, when the values of the projects can be different but are correlated 
and the second company to invest can observe and get additional information from the 
investment decision of the first one. We show that under certain conditions the second company 
will invest in the development of a new oil field even if it received a bad informative signal 
about the profitability of the project. We also show that when companies receive noisy public 
and private information, the second company may be more likely to invest after receiving a bad 
signal. 
There are reasons why information externalities and information spillovers might be 
important in oil exploration. The fields within a region may be located over a common oil pool 
or have similar geological characteristics. In both cases, the values of nearby tracts are 
correlated. A discovery of oil in a region is usually seen as a signal that there is more oil in 
nearby fields. Thus, there are information externalities provided by exploratory drillings. 
The role of information externalities in oil exploration was studied by Hendricks and 
Kovenock (1989) and Hendricks and Porter (1996). Both papers were motivated by leasing 
practices of the US federal government, when the tracts are auctioned at the same time. Then the 
firms that won choose simultaneously whether and when to invest in exploratory drillings in the 
fields they acquired taking into account their private information and possible information 
externalities. 
A few economists considered similar problem in more general framework. These papers 
include Bolton and Harris (1999), Frisell (2003) and Decamps and Mariotti (2004). All these 
models look at simultaneous irreversible investment decisions of the agents in the presence of 
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asymmetric information and information externalities. Bolton and Harris (1999) study a strategic 
setting where each period players decide how much time they would invest into risky action 
given that they can learn from the experience of others. Frisell (2003) looks at a situation when 
two firms simultaneously decide when to enter the market and where to position themselves in 
product space. The firms do not know the exact market demand, but possess some asymmetric 
private information as well as can benefit from information spillover provided by the decision of 
the firm that invests first. Decamps and Mariotti (2004) study a duopoly model where players 
investment decision improves the quality of the signal received by its rival about the return of a 
common value project. Each firm has an incentive to delay its investment decision to convince 
the rival company that its costs are lower and it should invest first. 
However, it is not always the case that the companies simultaneously decide whether to 
invest or not. As it was the case in the Caspian, tracts can be offered randomly at different times, 
so that by the time an oil company decides whether to invest in a field, it may observe the result 
of exploratory efforts in neighboring tracts. In this case, the firms that acquire oil fields later do 
not care about how much information their exploration decision may provide to the firms that 
will invest after them (since they do not know when and whether more tracts are going to be 
offered), but may free-ride on the additional public information provided by firms that have 
already invested in the neighboring fields. The information revealed by other firms may be so 
strong that the companies that make investment decision later may choose to invest in 
exploration despite their bad private signal. 
The situation described above fits the social learning framework introduced by Sharfstein 
and Stein (1990), and Banerjee (1992) and Bikhandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), which was 
further developed by Smith and Sorensen (2000) and Kariv (2004). The social learning models 
 72 
analyze an economy where exogenously ordered Bayesian agents try to pick the profitable 
project among given possibilities. Each decision-maker receives a private signal conditioned on 
the state of the world and can observe the picks of the agents before her. Since every agent uses 
her private information to choose the best project, each individual's decision reveals some 
information about her private signal hence producing an information externality. Therefore, the 
agents that decide later can free-ride on this additional information to improve their decisions. 
The main conclusion of the models above is that eventually effect of the information 
externality becomes so overwhelming that every individual mimics the choice of her 
predecessor, even though she would have picked differently if she had decided on her own 
information alone. However, this behavior is fragile in a sense that a strong signal may cause it 
to change dramatically. 
The above models also cannot be applied directly to explain the Caspian investment case 
since in oil exploration, the companies do not choose between the same projects. To the contrary, 
the companies are considering different investment opportunities which outcomes are correlated. 
In other words, after the state of the world is realized, it may be good for some companies and 
bad for the others. Hence, the information delivered through information externality is weaker 
than in traditional social learning models. It depends on the correlation between the projects' 
payoffs. This makes the decision of oil companies more complicated and their mimicing 
behavior more fragile than under a traditional social learning set-up. 
We expand the existing social learning and oil exploration literature by examining 
decisions of the companies when they sequentially choose to invest in the projects of probably 
different but correlated values. Following Sharfstein and Stein (1990), we model the situation 
when two oil firms sequentially decide whether to invest in exploratory drillings in neighboring 
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fields after each company received a private signal about the deposits in its field. The main 
features of our model are motivated by the oil development practices in the Caspian region 
which are discussed in Section 2. The reserves of the fields are unknown, but correlated in a 
sense that if one field contains oil, the other tract is more likely to contain oil as well. The actual 
size of the reserves can only be learned after drilling. Since the firms decide sequentially, the 
first firm will use its private information only in making investment decision. Its action will 
reveal some additional information to the firm that decides second because of the correlation of 
the deposits. The amount and quality of the revealed information will influence the decision of 
the second company. 
We analyze the conditions that make companies explore in their fields. In particular, we 
are interested in the decision of the second firm since it is the one that can exploit information 
externalities. We pay additional attention to the situations when the second firm decides to drill 
in the field despite its bad private signal. 
We will consider two possible situations: 1) both companies receive informative signals 
and 2) both companies receive noisy signals. We will show that under certain circumstances, the 
second company will be more eager to contradict its bad signal and follow the decision of the 
first company to drill when the available information is noisy. We argue that this is consistent 
with what we observed during the Caspian oil boom. Despite the noisy available public and 
private information, the companies with bad signals were more prone to follow the decision of 
the first companies to invest in Caspian oil. That's why we observed a somewhat unexpected 
high investment in the region where the possible reserves were very poorly explored. 
We will also contrast the situation when the second company observes not just the 
decision of the first one, but also the size of the deposit it found if it decided to drill, with the 
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situation when the second company observes just the investment decision of the first company. 
The information externality in the second case is noisier than in the first one since it reveals not 
as much information about the reserves in the first field, but information about the signal of the 
first company which is not a perfect predictor of its reserves. 
We will show that the second company will be more likely to contradict its signal after 
observing the reserves in the other field, i.e. when information externality is less noisy. In other 
words, the second company will be less likely to mimic the decision of the first one and explore 
in its field after the first company found low reserves. We argue that this result is consistent with 
the decrease of investment flow to the Caspian oil fields after 1999: a strong negative public 
information made the companies more cautious. 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses oil exploration boom 
in the Caspian region; Section 4.3 presents the model; Section 4.4 defines decisions of the firms 
under information externalities of different quality, Section 4.5 compares these decisions and 
Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 OIL EXPLORATION IN THE CASPIAN REGION 
The Caspian region14 opened for international investment in early 1990. In a short period of 
time, the region managed to attract a huge volume of investment into its oil and gas fields. For 
example, in Azerbaijan alone the contracts signed with the foreign oil companies by 1998 
represented over $30 billion in long-term capital investment with some $2.5 billion in sunk and 
committed investment (International Energy Agency, 1998; International Energy Agency, 2000). 
                                                 
14 The Caspian region (namely, former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) is defined by 
geology, i.e. location of conformed oil and gas reserves in particular, rather than demography. 
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To some of the experts, the volume and dynamics of the foreign investment flow was 
surprising. First, the size of the Caspian proven reserves was not significant in comparison to 
some other areas in the world. Despite the fact that the region had been poorly explored and its 
real oil potential was unknown15, most of the experts agreed that the Caspian would never 
become "the second Middle East" and was more likely to be comparable in its importance with 
the North Sea. Second, the majority of the oil companies entered the region in 1997-1998, six 
years after they had gained access to the Caspian reserves. Soon after, however, the investment 
excitement started calming down with no new companies coming to the region and no new 
exploration projects emerging. 
Some of the possible explanations of the shape and amount of investment in the Caspian 
are the nature of the oil industry and the legal environment in the region. Since oil is not a 
renewable resource and the companies are constantly looking for replacement of their old, 
worked-out reserves, the opening up of the Caspian oil provided the companies with the access 
to new oil areas which were the best investment prospects given the other oil regions open for 
international development16. The decent legal environment strong enough to support investment 
of oil companies emerged by 1996-1997, thus the most of the contracts were signed in 1997-
1998. 
                                                 
15 According to the US State Department report to the Congress, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan's proven oil reserves 
were 3.6 and 10 billion barrels respectfully, which is much smaller than, let's say, Russia's 56 billion barrels or 
Venezuelan 74.9 billion barrels or Saudi Arabian 261.5 (US Department of State, 1997; BP, 2004). Despite the fact 
that there were no agreement on the upper bound of the possible reserves, it varied from 13.2 billion barrels of 
undiscovered reserves in Azerbaijan by the US Department of the Interior to 27 billion barrels of possible reserves 
in Azerbaijan only and probable 178 billion barrels in the whole region by the US State Department (US Department 
of Interior, 1982; US Department of State, 1997). 
16 In mid-1990, the production from the oil provinces of the Alaskan North Slope and the North Sea was declining. 
However, most of the richest oil regions (e.g., Middle East countries) were either completely closed or offer limited 
opportunities to the international investment. 
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However, the above explanations still do not provide a decent reason why so much 
investment came to the poorly explored region in such a short period of time and why it fell 
drastically after 1999. After 1999, no new region opened up as a major new play; the legal 
environment in the Caspian stayed unchanged. 
To our mind, the problem with the above explanations is that they do not take into 
account informational environment in which the companies had to make their investment 
decisions. As it has been mentioned above, the actual reserves in the region were unknown. 
Hence, the possible information externalities from any new exploration efforts had to play a very 
important role in oil exploration in the Caspian. 
Let's look at the Caspian investment boom closer. To make discussion less complicated, 
we will examine investment in Azerbaijan only since it attracted most investment in unexplored 
fields. Table 4.2.1 presents the dynamics of investment in Azerbaijan in 1994-2000: 
 
Table 4.2.1 Dynamics of Oil Investment in Azerbaijan 
Company 
Year 
Number of 
Contracts 
Signed 
Major Non-Major 
Average 
Bonus Per 
Contract 
Main Events
1994 1 1 0 150  
1995 1 0 1 8  
1996 2 2 0 22.5  
1997 5 5 0 10 
The first 
contract started 
production 
1998 7 3 4 14 2 contract areas 
revealed no oil 
1999 3 2 1 75  
2000 1 0 1 n.a.  
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The companies entered Azerbaijan sequentially, with a few projects emerging in 1994-
1996 and much more in 1997 and 1998. Starting 1999, almost no one was willing to invest in the 
country's oil fields. 
The reason for sequential decision-making by the companies was a cautious procedure of 
contracting off the tracts introduced by the local government. The fields were offered either by 
one or in small groups in different periods of time to the particular oil company/consortium; each 
contract was negotiated individually. All contracts in Azerbaijan had the following feature: if a 
company had entered a contract, it committed itself to a minimum exploration program on the 
area of the contract. The company was to conduct seismic analysis of the area and drill three to 
five exploratory wells with targeted depth within a certain period of time or pay a fine equal to 
the costs associated with the commitment. Thus, if a company decided to enter the contract, it 
committed itself to the irreversible investment decision; it could not simply sit and wait till some 
one else drilled first. 
Information on the signed contracts and their development updates was available through 
companies' press releases and different media outlets. Hence, by the time the later companies 
were considering signing a contract, they were able to observe whether other companies had 
entered contracts in neighboring fields and even the results of their exploratory drillings if the 
timing of investment decision was long after the first contracts were signed. 
The traditional models of investment in the presence of information externalities cannot 
be applied to the investment process described above. These models look at the cases, when the 
firms decide simultaneously whether to invest or not; in their decision they have to take into 
account the trade-off between additional information revealed through information externalities 
and lost profit due to delaying investment decision. 
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Investment in Azeri oil fields is closer to the decision-making mechanism analyzed in 
social learning literature. There, the agents make sequential investment decisions and every next 
decision maker is able to observe the history of actions taken before her. The history of decisions 
provides information externality, the effect of which can be so strong that the later companies 
may choose to invest in a certain project despite their private information. This may be consistent 
with the investment spike in the Caspian in mid-1990s: some of the companies that were offered 
the tracts later might have been following the decision of the first companies to invest. 
However, the results of social learning models also cannot be directly used to explain 
Caspian oil boom. In the social learning set-up, the agents are choosing to invest in the same 
projects. In the Caspian, the companies were offered investment opportunities in different tracts, 
deposits size of which could have been correlated. Hence, the information externalities provided 
to the later companies were not as strong. The amount of information revealed by the decisions 
of the first-comers depended on the beliefs about correlation between the fields reserves. 
Besides, different companies observed information externalities of different quality. 
Some of the companies were offered a tract after the first company just had made its investment 
decision; others were considering drilling in a tract after the drilling results of the first company 
had become known. 
Decisions of oil companies also depend on private signals and their quality. When the 
companies were offered a tract, they would receive some seismic information on the area. Ex 
post, we can infer how promising this information was. After texts of the contracts were released, 
we got information on the size of signature bonuses of each contract (average bonus per year is 
presented in Table 4.3.1). A signature bonus is a company's cost of signing a contract. Its' size is 
negotiated before the contract is signed and it is typically paid to the government of Azerbaijan 
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within 30 days of the contract going into effect. The size of a signature bonus depends on the 
size of the expected reserves and probability of getting them: the bigger the field and the more 
certain its reserves are, the bigger is the signature bonus. 
Note that the signature bonus information was not disclosed to other companies at the 
time the contract was signed. However, ex post we can conclude that the first company to enter 
Azerbaijan had the most promising private information (see Table 4.3.1): it agreed to pay a huge 
bonus of $150 million dollars. 
As experts noted, the seismic information provided by local governments was of good 
quality but difficult to interpret: Caspian off-shore reserves are located in a young basin that has 
not reached its equilibrium yet because the productive part of the Caspian Sea is still moving 
(Appendix a: interviewees #6, #9, #11). Hence, some companies would have more difficulties in 
interpreting data that the others. 
Note from Table 4.3.1 that Azeri fields attracted oil companies of different types. In 
particular, the companies that entered Azeri contracts can be divided into two categories: (1) 
internationally integrated oil companies ("majors"), and (2) domestically integrated and 
independent exploration and production oil companies ("non-majors"). Majors are involved in 
every aspect of oil business (exploration and production, transportation of crude oil and refined 
products, and refining and marketing) both in the domestic and overseas markets. Non-majors 
have their main operations in the domestic markets and only limited exploration and production 
operations in the foreign markets. Since the majors have more involvement in oil production, it is 
believed they have more expertise in exploring new fields and thus are better in interpreting the 
data they receive on potential projects. Note from Table 4.3.1 that the first companies to enter the 
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region were mostly majors. Non-majors come to the region after good exploration results of the 
first project were disclosed. 
To summarize, the decision making of oil companies concerning Caspian oil projects had 
the following features. First, the companies decided whether to invest in exploration of the fields 
(i.e., whether to enter a contract or not) sequentially; the timing and order of decision-making 
was rather random and determined exogenously (by the government). Second, before making an 
investment decision, companies received private information about the contract area. This 
information could have been not just promising or not, but also quite noisy due to interpretation 
difficulties. 
Third, because of media disclosures, the companies to decide later were able to observe 
whether other companies entered contracts in neighboring fields and even the results of their 
exploratory efforts. This publicly available information provided some information externalities 
which were weaker in the case when the later companies observed the decision of the first 
company compared to the case when they observed the actual reserves found by the first 
company. 
These features of the sequential exploration in presence of information externalities of 
different quality can be captured in a model with two firms and two fields presented in the next 
section. We show that the second company is more likely to contradict its private information 
and follow the decision of the first one when both companies receive noisy signals. We also 
show that the second company is more likely to contradict its private information when the 
quality of its signal is equal or less than the quality of the signal of the first company. 
The result above explains why majors with relatively poor private information (i.e., 
information worth a rather small signature bonus) entered the region in 1995-1996. Under noisy 
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private information and weak information externality (they just observed the decision of the fist 
major to enter), they were more prone to mimic the decision of the first major to enter. 
We also show that when information externality is stronger, i.e. the second firm is able to 
observe the results of the first firm's exploration efforts; it is more likely to contradict its signal. 
This explains a spike in investment in the Caspian region in 1997-1998: after good drilling 
results of the first project were released, non only majors but also non-majors were attracted to 
the region. Also, this result provides explanation why investment stopped coming to the region 
after 1999. In 1998 bad exploration information became available. As a result, almost no new 
projects emerged; the projects that were signed, had rather high signature bonuses suggesting 
that the seismic information was so promising that it overwhelmed negative public information. 
The next two sections will develop the described above results formally. 
4.3 A MODEL OF SEQUENTIAL EXPLORATION 
Assume there are two oil fields located next to each other, 1 and 2. The reserves in the fields are 
disjoint. The size of the reserves r in each field is unknown; it could be either high (ri=1) or low 
(ri=0) with equal probability, i.e., 
                                                      
                                                        Pr(ri=1) = Pr(ri=0) = 0.5; i = 1,2                                       (1) 
 
The actual reserves of a field can be observed only after drilling. There are four states of 
the world, R, that are possible: {11,12}, {11,02}, {01,12} and {01,02}. 
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The reserves sizes in the fields are believed to be correlated. If high oil reserves are found 
in one of the fields, the other field is believed to contain high reserves with probability q>0.5; 
similarly, if there are low oil reserves found in one field, then the other is expected to have low 
reserves with probability q as well. I.e., 
 
                                                     Pr(ri=1|rj=1) = Pr(ri=0|rj=0) = q>0.5;                                 (2) 
                                                     Pr(ri=1|rj=0) = Pr(ri=0|rj=1) = (1-q); i,j = 1,2; i≠j 
 
(1) and (2) define the following joint distribution of the reserves: 
 
Table 4.3.1 Joint Distribution of Reserves, Pr(ri,rj) = Pr(ri|rj) Pr(rj) 
 1j 0j 
0.5q 0.5(1-q) 1i 
0.5(1-q) 0.5q   0i 
                                                                                                                                             (3) 
Note that since q>0.5, then matching states of the world (i.e., the states where both fields 
have the reserves of the same size) are more likely. 
There are two firms, F1 and F2, considering drilling in each field: F1 in field 1 and F2 in 
field 2. If a firm drills and finds high reserves, it starts developing the field and gets a positive 
payoff of xH; if it drills and finds low reserves, the firm has a loss of -xL; |xH| > |xL| > 1. 
Each firm receives a informative private signal, siI, about oil reserves in the field it is 
considering: siI = 1 for high reserves and siI = 0 for low reserves (the assumption of informative 
signals will be relaxed later in the paper). The signals have the following structure: 
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where f(ri) is some function of the reserves in field i. Note that given the reserve size in each 
field, the signals are independent. However, when deposits sizes are unknown, the signals are 
correlated since random variables ri and rj are correlated. 
    We assume that 
 
                                                                 f(1i) > 0;                                       (4)                         
f(0i) < 0 
 
(4) insures that firm i is more likely to receive a high signal about its field reserve size if 
the field actually contains high reserves. 
The structure of the signals imposes the following conditional distribution of the signals: 
 
Pr(siI = 1|ri) = Pr(f(ri) + εi > 0) = Pr(- εi < f(ri)) = Φ(f(ri));  
         Pr(siI = 0|ri)= 1- Φ(f(ri))                                                              (5) 
 
(4) implies that for firm i, 
 
Φ(f(1i)) > 0.5> Φ(f(0i))                                                  (6) 
    Distribution (5) defines the following conditional distributions of the signals: 
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                  Pr(siI = 1|ri,rj) = Pr(siI = 1|ri) = Φ(f(ri)) 
                 Pr(siI = 0|ri,rj) = Pr(siI=0|ri) = 1 - Φ(f(ri))                                             (7) 
 
             Pr(siI = 1,sjI=1|ri,rj) = Pr(-εi < f(ri), -εj < f(rj)) = Φ(f(ri)) Φ(f(rj))            (8) 
              Pr(siI = 1,sjI=0|ri,rj) = Φ(f(ri))(1 - Φ(f(rj))) 
 
Note that signals are good instruments since (6) implies the following about distributions 
(7) and (8): 
 
                               1) Pr(siI = ri|ri) > Pr(siI ≠ ri|ri) 
                                        2) Pr({siI,sjI }= {1,1}|1i,1j) > Pr({siI,sjI }≠ {1,1}|1i,1j) 
                                   Pr({siI,sjI} = {1,0}|1i,0j) > Pr({siI,sjI} ≠ {1i,0j}|1i,0j) 
                                       Pr({siI,sjI}={0,0}|0i,0j) > Pr({siI,sjI}≠{0i,0j}|0i,0j) 
 
(all of the proofs are presented in Appendix B). 
Hence, an informative signal i does a good job in predicting the reserves of field i as well 
as the combination of the signals does a good job in predicting the state of the world. 
    For simplicity, let 
 
                                                         f(0i) = - f (1i)17                                                        
                                                 
17 It is possible to construct such a function. For example, for firm i 
                                                                f(ri)  = 2ri -1→ 
f(1i)  = 1; f(0i) = -1 
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                                                         and Φ (f(1i) = a > 0.5 
   
 
Then conditional distributions of firm i's signals defined in (7) and (8) look as follows: 
 
Table 4.3.2 Distribution of Firm i's Signal Conditional on ri, Pr(siI|ri) 
 Pr(siI|1i) Pr(siI|0i) 
siI=1 a 1-a 
siI=0 1-a a 
                                                                                                                          (9) 
 Table 4.3.3. Distribution of Firm i's Signal Conditional on {ri,rj}, Pr(siI|ri,rj) 
 Pr(siI|1i,1j) Pr(siI|0i,1j) Pr(siI|1i,0j) Pr(siI|0i,0j) 
siI=1 a a 1-a 1-a 
siI=0 1-a 1-a a a 
                                                                                                                           (10) 
Table 4.3.4 Distribution of Combinations of Signals Conditional on {ri,rj}, Pr(siI,sj|ri,rj) 
Pr(siI,sjI|1i,1j) Pr(siI,sjI|1i,0j) Pr(siI,sjI|0i,1j) Pr(siI,sjI|0i,0j)  
siI = 1,sjI = 1 a² a(1-a) a(1-a) (1-a)² 
siI = 1,sjI = 0 a(1-a) a² (1-a)² a(1-a) 
siI = 0,sjI = 1 a(1-a)  (1-a)² a² a(1-a)  
siI = 0,sjI = 0 (1-a)² a(1-a) a(1-a) a² 
                                                                                                                                         (11) 
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Note that a priori, each signal is equally likely to be received by firm i: 
    
                                         Pr(siI=1) = Pr(siI=0) = 0.5                                            (12)             
 
From Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.4 we can get unconditional distribution of all possible signals 
combinations: 
 
           Pr(siI=1,sj=1) = Pr(siI=0,sj=0) = 0.5a²q + 0.5(1-a)²q+a(1-a)(1-q)                        (13) 
           Pr(siI = 1,sj=0)=Pr(siI=0,sj=1) = 0.5a²(1-q) + 0.5(1-a)²(1-q)+a(1-a)q                  (14) 
 
Note that a priory, it is more likely to receive a matching combination of the signals than 
a non-matching combination since 
 
 Pr(siI = 1,sj=1)=Pr(siI=0,sj=0) > Pr(siI=1,sj=0)=Pr(siI=0,sj=1) 
 
This makes sense since a priory matching states of the world are more likely than non-
matching states. 
Firms decide whether to drill in its field sequentially: F1 decides first and F2 decides 
second. F2 can observe the action of F1. Each firm will decide to drill if its expected profit from 
drilling is positive. The decision process goes as follows: first, the nature determines the state of 
the world; then, the firms get signals; next, F1 decides whether to drill or not; finally, F2 observes 
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the action of F1 and then makes its decision to drill.      
   
4.4 DECISION OF THE COMPANIES UNDER PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
INFORMATION OF DIFFERENT QUALITY 
4.4.1 Case 1: Firm 2 Received an Informative Signal and Observes Reserves in the 
Neighboring Field 
Here, before making its decision, F2 considers the best information possible under the above set-
up. F2 has received an informative signal, s2I, and observes not only the decision of F1 to drill or 
not, but also the reserves in field 1, r1, if F1 decides to drill. In other words, information 
externality generated by F1's exploration efforts is rather strong. This corresponds to a case, 
when F2 has to decide whether to drill or not in its field long after F1 decided to drill. In Case 1 
we address the situation when F1 decides to drill in its field and finds the size of its deposit (the 
situation when F1 decides not to drill in its field is analyzed in Case 2). 
    In this case, F1's decision to drill per se is not important to F2 since the size of the deposit in 
field 1 provides stronger information externality. F2 incorporates this additional information and 
uses (3), (10) and (12) to calculate its expected profit: 
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F2 will decide to drill in its field if EΠ2|{s2I,r2}>0. I can write the decision rule of F2 as follows: 
 88 
  drill iff 0  < EΠ2|{s2I,r1}↔ 
 xL < T{s2I,r1} (xH) 
              : = T{s2I,r1} 
As it is seen, we define F2's decision as a cut-off strategy: it decides to drill if the losses 
are below some function of the possible gain. There are four cutoffs since F2 has two possible 
signals and observes two possible reserve sizes in the other field. The cutoffs are presented in the 
table below:  
 
Table 4.4.1.1 Case 1: Cutoffs of F2, T{s2I,r1} 
Reserves of F1 Signal 
of F2 11 01 
q
q
a
a −
−
1
1
 xH q
q
a
a
−− 11 xH s2=1 
q
q
a
a
−
−
1
1  xH q
q
a
a −− 11  xH s2=0 
  
   
    The thresholds, defining F2's decision in each case, show the trade-off between 
information delivered by the signal (the first part of each cutoff) and information delivered 
through the information externality (the second part of each cutoff). If the signal is very precise, 
i.e., a→1, then F2 will be less likely to drill after receiving a low signal and more likely to drill 
after receiving a high signal despite the reserve size in the other field. On the other hand, if the 
correlation between the fields is very high, i.e., q→1, then F2 will be more likely to drill after 
observing high reserves and will never drill after observing low reserves independent of its 
private signal. 
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    Note that xL< T{s2I,r1} for all a, q >0.5; xH > xL. Thus, F2 will always drill after 
receiving a high signal and observing high reserves in the neighboring field. F2's decision rule in 
Case 1 is summarized in Table 4.4.1.2: 
 
Table 4.4.1.2 Case 1: Decision Rule of F2 
Reserves of F1 Signal 
of F2 11 01 
Always drill Drill if  
s2I = 1  
xL< T{s2I=1,01} 
Drill if  Drill if  
s2I = 0 
xL< T{s2I=0,11} xL< T{s2I=0,01} 
 
The above thresholds are ordered as follows: 
 
                            T{s2I=1,01} > T{s2I=0,01}                                                                      (15) 
                            T{s2I=0,11} > T{s2I=0,01}                                                                  (16) 
                            T{s2I=1,01} ≷ T{s2I=0,11} iff q
qor
a
a
−<>− 11                         (17) 
Note that the last ordering depends on information provided by F2's signal vs. information 
provided through information externality. If a→1, then T{s2I=1,01} > T{s2I=0,11} and F2 will be more 
likely to trust its signal than look at the reserves in the other field. On the other hand, if q→1, 
then T{s2I=1,01} < T{s2I=0,11} and F2 will be more likely to look at the reserves in field 1 than at its 
signal. 
    (15), (16) and (17) together with Table 4.4.1.2 imply Proposition 1: 
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 Proposition 1  
1) Given low reserves were found in the other field, F2 is more likely to drill in its field after 
receiving a high informative signal than after receiving a low informative signal. 
2) Given it received a low informative signal, F2 is more likely to drill in its field after high 
reserves were found in the other field than after low reserves were. 
3) F2 is more likely to follow its informative signal when its informativeness, a, is very high. If 
the correlation between the reserves, q, is very high then F2 is more likely to contradict its 
informative signal. 
 
4.4.2 Case 2: Firm 2 Received an Informative Signal and Observes Decision of Firm 1 
In Case 2, F2 will just observe the decision of F1 to drill or not when both firms receive 
informative signals, i.e., information externality provided by F1's decision is weaker. This 
corresponds to the situation, when F2 has to make its decision after F1 decided whether to drill or 
not, but before the drilling results became available if F1 decided to drill. In this case decision of 
F1 may reveal its signal about the reserves in field 1. This information is still valuable to F2 since 
the fields reserves are correlated. But F2 also has to consider that there is a positive probability 
that F1's signal is wrong. 
In order to see how much information can be revealed by F1, let's analyze its decision 
rule. Since there is no strategic element in its decision, F1 will choose to drill using its signal 
only. In particular, after receiving a signal, F1 uses (3), (9), (12) and Bayes rule to find its 
expected profit: 
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and decides to drill if the expected profit is positive. As in deriving the decision rule of F2, we 
can identify the cutoffs, T{s1I=1}, of F1: 
 
Table 4.4.2.1 Case 2: Cutoffs of F1 
Signal of F1   Cutoffs of F1, 
 T{s1I=1} 
a
a
−1 xH s1
I = 1 
a
a−1 xH s1I = 0 
  
F1 will drill in its field if the loss is below the corresponding cut-off. Note that xL< 
T{s1I=1} for all a>0.5, meaning that F1 will always drill after receiving a high signal. 
Consequently, if xL < T{s1I=0}, then F1 drills independent of its signal and no private information 
is revealed. However, if xL > T{s1I=0}, then F1 drills only after receiving a high signal revealing its 
private information. 
Let 
                                                              xL > T{s1I=0}                                            (18) 
so that F2 can benefit from observing the decision of F1. It then updates its expectation of 
reserves in its field accordingly and uses (3), (11), (13) and Bayes rule to get expected profit: 
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The decision cutoffs for F2 are: 
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Table 4.4.2.2 Case 2: Cutoffs of F2, T{s2I, s1I } 
  
Signal of F1  
Signal of F2 s1I = 1 s1I = 0 
B
A
a
a
−1 xH A
B
a
a
−1  xH s2
I = 1 
B
A
a
a−1  xH A
B
a
a−1  xH s2I = 0 
 
where A  = (1-a)(1-q)+aq; B  = a(1-q)+(1-a)q 
As in Case 1, the first part of the above thresholds evaluates the information delivered to 
F2 by its private signal. The second part evaluates information externality, i.e., the information 
delivered by the decision of the other firm. This information depends now not only on the 
correlation between the fields, but also on the informativeness of F1's signal. 
Note that xL< T{s2I=1, s1I=1 }, T{s2I=1, s1I=0 }, for all a, q > 0.5; xH > xL. Thus, after receiving a 
high informative signal, F2 always drills. This result is quite intuitive: F2's signal provides noisy 
information externality since it is not a perfect predictor of the reserves in field 1. Given that F2 
has no reason to trust the signal of another firm more than its own, it will always drill after 
receiving a good signal. 
Also, T{s2I=0, s1I=0 } < T{s1I=0 }. Thus, under restriction (18), F2 will never drill if it received 
a low informative signal and observes that F1 decided not to drill in its field. Since T{s2I=0, s1I=1 } 
>T{s1I>0 }, then F2 will contradict its low informative signal and decide to drill after observing F1's 
decision to drill iff 
T{s1I =0} < xL < T{s2I=0, s1I=1 } 
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Decision rule of F2 in Case 2 is summarized in Table 4.4.2.3: 
 
Table 4.4.2.3 Case 2: Decision Rule of F2 
Signal of F1, xL > T{s1I =0} 
Signal of F2 
s1I = 1 s1I = 0 
s2I = 1 Always drill Always drill 
s2I = 0 
Drill iff  
 
T{s1I =0} < xL < 
T{s2I=0, s1I=1 } 
 
Never drill 
 
Table 4.4.2.3 gives Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2 
Let xL> T{s1I =0}. 
Then after receiving a low informative signal, F2 is more likely to drill in its field after it 
observes F1's decision to drill in field 1 than after observing F1's decision not to drill. 
 
In the next two cases, we complicate the information structure. We assume that firms' 
private signals are not completely informative anymore, but noisy. Let's call these signal siN. Fi 
expects to receive an informative signal, siI, with probability Pr(siN=siI) = θi > 0.5; in this case the 
signal provides some information about deposit of field i and its conditional distribution is the 
one defined in (9). However, with probability (1- θi), Fi expects to receive an uninformative 
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signal, siU. The probability of receiving high or low uninformative signal is simply 0.5 
independent of the deposit size, i.e. 
 
                   Pr(siU = 1|ri) = Pr(siU=0|ri) = 0.5 
                   Pr(siU = 1|ri,rj) = Pr(siU=1|ri,rj)  = Pr(siU=1|ri,rj) = Pr(siU=0|ri,rj)=0.5                     (19) 
 
The next two cases discuss situations examined in Cases 1 and 2 in the presence of noisy 
signals. 
 
4.4.3 Case 3: Firm 2 Received a Noisy Signal and Observes Reserves in the Neighboring 
Field 
Similar to Case 1, here F2 is able to observe the reserves in field 1. Given that the signal is noisy, 
the expected profit of F2 is a linear combination of its expected profits when the signals are 
informative and uninformative, weighted by the probabilities of getting an informative and 
uninformative signal: 
,},{|)Pr(},{|
,};{
122222122 ∑
=
=Π==Π
UIxx
xNxNN rssEssrsE  
where LxN
x
N
HxN
xN
xN x
rss
rrssx
rss
rrssrssE
)Pr()Pr(
),0Pr(),0|Pr(
)Pr()Pr(
),1Pr(),1|Pr(},{|
122
121222
122
121222
1222 =
=−=
===Π  
As in previous cases, there are four cutoffs to be considered by F2 depending on its signal 
and observed reserves. F2 will decide to drill if the loss is below the corresponding threshold. 
The cut-off for Case 2, T{s2N, r1}, are presented in Table 4.4.3.1: 
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Table 4.4.3.1 Case 3: Cutoffs of F2, T{s2N, r1} 
Reserves of F1 Signal 
of F2 11 01 
q
q
a
a
−−+−
−+
1)1()1(2
)1(2
22
22
θθ
θθ xH q
q
a
a −
−+−
−+ 1
)1()1(2
)1(2
22
22
θθ
θθ  xH s2N = 1 
q
q
a
a
−−+
−+−
1)1(2
)1()1(2
22
22
θθ
θθ  xH q
q
a
a −
−+
−+− 1
)1(2
)1()1(2
22
22
θθ
θθ  xH s2N = 0 
 
Here again we see that the first part of the cutoffs evaluates the information delivered by 
the signal; the second part evaluates the information delivered through the information 
externality. 
Note that xL < T{s2N=1, 11} for all θ2, a, q > 0.5; xH > xL. Hence, F2 will always drill after 
receiving a high noisy signal and observing high reserves in the neighboring field. The decision 
rule of F2 in Case 3 is provided in Table 4.4.3.2: 
 
Table 4.4.3.2 Case 3: Decision Rule of F2 
 
Reserves of F1 Signal 
of F2 11 01 
s2N = 1  
Always drill Drill if  
xL< T{s2N=1,01} 
Drill if  Drill if  
s2N = 0 
xL< T{s2N=0,11} xL< T{s2N=0,01} 
 
The cutoffs in Table 4.4.3.2 can be ranked as follows: 
                          T{s2N=1,01} > T{s2N=0,01}                                                                                     (20) 
               T{s2N=0,11} > T{s2N=0,01}                                                                                 (21) 
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              T{s2N=1,01} ≷ T{s2N=0,11} iff q
qor
a
a
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)1(2
22
22
θθ
θθ                   (22) 
As in Case 1, the last ordering depends on the trade-off between information provided by 
the signal and information revealed through information externality. However, in this case 
information revealed by F2's signal depends not only its informativeness, a, but also on its 
quality. Thus, if θ2, a→1, then T{s2N=1,01} > T{s2N=0,11} and F2 will more likely to trust its signal 
rather than look at the drilling results in the other field. Similarly, if q→1, then T{s2N=1,01} > 
T{s2N=0,11}  and F2 is more likely to trust the information provided by the reserves in the other 
field than trust its signal. 
(20), (21) and (22) prove Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3 
1) Given low reserves were found in the other field, F2 is more likely to drill in its field after 
receiving a high noisy signal than after receiving a low noisy signal. 
2) Given it received a low noisy signal, F2 is more likely to drill in its field after high reserves 
were found in the other field than after low reserves were found. 
3) F2 is more likely to follow its noisy signal when its signal’s informativeness, a, and quality , θ, 
are very high. If the correlation between the reserves, q, is very high, then F2 is more likely to 
contradict its noisy signal. 
4.4.4 Case 4: Firms 1 and 2 Received Noisy Signals; Firm 2 Observes Decision of Firm 1 
In this Case, F2 decides whether to drill in its field or not under the noisiest information out of all 
the four cases: it received a not perfect signal and the information externality provided by 
observing the decision of F2 is of poor quality since F2's signal may be uninformative. 
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Let's see how much information can be revealed by the decision of F1 under this 
information structure. Note that now F1's decision is more complicated: after receiving its signal, 
F1 has to take into account the possibility that it may be uninformative. F1's expected profit, 
given the probabilities of receiving informative and uninformative signals, is 
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F1's decision cutoffs are: 
Table 4.4.4.1 Case 4: Cutoffs of F1 
Signal of F1   Cutoffs of F1, 
 T{s1N=1} 
s1N = 1 )1()1(2
)1(2
11
11
θθ
θθ
−+−
−+
a
a xH 
s1N = 0 )1(2
)1()1(2
11
11
θθ
θθ
−+
−+−
a
a xH 
     
Since xL< T{s1N=1} for all  θ, a>0.5, F1 always drills after receiving a high signal. When xL 
> T{s1N=1}, F1 will drill in its field only if it received a high noisy signal and will not drill 
otherwise. Hence, when xL > T{s1N=1}, then decision of F1 will indicate its signal. 
Let  
                                              xL > T{s1N=1}                                                      (23) 
 
 so that F2 is able to guess the private signal of F1 after observing its decision. Now F2's task to 
incorporate information externality provided by F1 is quite difficult. It knows that there are four 
possible cases: 1) both firms received informative signals; 2) F2 received an informative signal 
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and F1 received noise; 3) F1 received an informative signal and F2 received noise; 4) both firms 
received uninformative signals. Thus, there are four possible conditional distributions each 
combination of signals can be drawn from. 
    These distributions can be derived as suggested in (7) and (8) using (9), (10) and (19). 
Conditional distribution of combinations of informative signals is giver by (11). The other 
conditional distributions are given below:  
Table 4.4.4.2 Distribution of Combinations of Informative and  
Uninformative Signals {siI,sjU} Conditional on {ri,rj}, Pr(siI,sjU|ri,rj) 
 
 Pr(siI,sjU|1i,1j) Pr(siI,sjU|1i,0j) Pr(siI,sjU|0i,1j) Pr(siI,sjU|0i,0j) 
siI = 1,sjU = 1 0.5a 0.5a 0.5(1-a) 0.5(1-a) 
siI = 1,sjU = 0 0.5a 0.5a 0.5(1-a) 0.5(1-a) 
siI = 0,sjU = 1 0.5(1-a) 0.5(1-a) 0.5a 0.5a 
siI = 0,sjU = 0 0.5(1-a) 0.5(1-a) 0.5a 0.5a 
(24) 
Table 4.4.4.3 Distribution of Combinations of Uninformative Signals {siU,sjU} 
Conditional on {ri,rj}, Pr(siI,sjU|ri,rj) 
 
Pr(siU,sjU|1i,1j) Pr(siU,sjU |1i,0j) Pr(siU,sjU |0i,1j) Pr(siU,sjU |0i,0j)  
siU = 1,sjU = 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
siU = 1,sjU = 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
siU = 0,sjU = 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
siU = 0,sjU = 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
(25) 
From joint distribution of reserves (3) and (24), (25) it follows that 
Pr(siI = 1,sjU=1) = Pr(siI=1,sjU0) = Pr(siI=0,sjU=1) = Pr(siI=0,sjU=0) = 0.25 
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Pr(siU = 1,sjU=1) = Pr(siU=1,sjU0) = Pr(siU=0,sjU=1) = Pr(siU=0,sjU=0) = 0.25           (26) 
 
Using (11) and (24)-(26), F2 can figure out its expected profit in each of the four possible 
cases; then total expected profit is a linear combination of them weighted by their probabilities of 
occurrence: 
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F2's cutoffs in Case 4 are: 
 
Table 4.4.4.4 Case 4: Cutoffs of F2, T{s2N, s1N } 
Signal of F1, xL > T{ s1N=0 } Signal 
of F2 s1N = 1 s1N = 0 
s2N = 1 )5.0)1((
)5.0(
212
212
Θ+−Θ+Θ+
Θ+Θ+Θ+
aBD
aAC xH 
)5.0)1((
)5.0(
212
212
Θ+−Θ+Θ+
Θ+Θ+Θ+
aAE
aBF  xH 
s2N = 0 )5.0(
)5.0)1((
212
212
Θ+Θ+Θ+
Θ+−Θ+Θ+
aBF
aAE  xH 
)5.0(
)5.0)1((
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Θ+Θ+Θ+
Θ+−Θ+Θ+
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aBD  xH 
 
where A  = (1-a)(1-q)+aq 
 B  = a(1-q)+(1-a)q 
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The above thresholds capture a very complicated trade-off between the information 
provided to F2 by its signal and through information externality. Now, F2 has to consider not only 
the informativeness of the signals, but also their relative quality captured by Θ1 and Θ2. 
Note that xL< T{s2N=1, s1N=1 } for all a, q > 0.5; xH > xL. Then F2 will always drill after 
receiving a high noisy signal and observing that F1 decided to drill. 
Recall that in order for F1 to reveal its signal, we assumed that xL > T{ s1N=0 }. So for F2 to 
drill in its field after receiving a low noisy signal and guessing F1's signal, loss from drilling 
should be such that 
 
T{ s1N=0 }  < xL < T{s2N, s1N } 
  
The decision rule of F2 in Case 4 is presented in Table 4.4.4.5: 
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Table 4.4.4.5 Case 4: Decision Rule of F2 
Signal of F1, xL > T{s1N =0} Signal of F2 s1N = 1 s1N = 0 
Always drill 
Drill iff 
 s2N = 1 T{s1N =0} < xL <  
T{s2N=1, s1N=0 } 
s2N = 0 
Drill iff 
  
T{s1N =0} < xL < 
T{s2N=0, s1N=1 } 
 
Drill iff  
 
T{s1N =0} < xL < 
T{s2N=0, s1N=0 } 
 
 
     The cutoffs are ordered as follows: 
T{s2N=1, s1N=0 } > T{s2N=0, s1N=0 }                      (27) 
T{s2N=0, s1N=1 } > T{s2N=0, s1N=0 }                                (28) 
T{s2N=1, s1N=0 }≷ T{s2N=0, s1N=1 }                                 (29) 
Necessary but not sufficient condition for T{s2N=1, s1N=0 }> T{s2N=0, s1N=1 }  in (29) is  
q>Θ
Θ+Θ
2
12
2
                                                                             (30) 
Note that condition (30) does not depend on the informativeness of the signals, a. Since 
informativeness of the signals is the same for F1 and F2, then the difference in information 
provided by the signals depends on their quality, not informativeness. If θ2→1 or θ1→0, then 
T{s2N=1, s1N=0 }> T{s2N=0, s1N=1 } and F2 is more likely to trust its signal than the signal of F1. If 
q→1, then T{s2N=1, s1N=0 }> T{s2N=0, s1N=1 } when θ2> θ1, i.e., F2 is more likely to drill in its field if 
the quality of its signal is better. 
(27), (28) and (29) together with Table 4.4.4.5 prove Proposition 4: 
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Proposition 4 
Let xL > T{ s1N=0 }. Then 
1) Given that F1 decided not to drill in its field, F2 is more likely to drill in field 2 after receiving 
a high noisy signal than after receiving a low noisy signal. 
2) Given that it received a low noisy signal, F2 is more likely to drill in its field after observing 
F1's decision to drill in field 1 than after observing F1's decision not to drill.  
3) F2 is more likely to trust its signal when its quality, θ2, is very high or when the quality of F1's 
signal, θ1, is very low. If the correlation of the reserves, q, is very high, then F2 is more likely to 
trust its signal when the quality of the signal is better, θ2 > θ1. 
4.5 COMPARISON OF FIRM 2’S DECISIONS  
UNDER DIFFERENT INFORMATION STRUCTURES 
In this section we compare the decision rule of F2 in the cases presented above. In particular, we 
will see how quality of private information and quality of information externality affects decision 
of F2. 
Table 4.5.1 below summarizes the decision rule of F2: 
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Table 4.5.1 Decision of Firm 2 under Different Information Structures  
Case 1 Case 2 
Reserves of F1 Signal of F1, xL > T{s1I =0}  
Signal of F2 
11 12 s1I = 1 s1I = 0 
s2I = 1 
Always drill Drill if  
xL< T{s2I=1,01} 
Always drill Always drill 
s2I = 0 
Drill if  
xL< T{s2I=0,11} 
Drill if  
xL< T{s2I=0,01} 
Drill iff  
 
T{s1I =0} < xL < 
T{s2I=0, s1I=1 } 
 
Never drill 
Case 3 Case 4  
Reserves of F1 Signal of F1, xL > T{s1N =0} 
11 12 s1N = 1 s1N = 0 
s2N = 1 
Always drill Drill if  
xL< T{s2N=1,01} Always drill 
Drill iff 
 
T{s1N =0} < xL <  
T{s2N=1, s1N=0 } 
s2N = 0 
Drill if  Drill if  Drill iff Drill iff  
   xL< T{s2N=0,11} xL< T{s2N=0,01} T{s1N =0} < xL < 
T{s2N=0, s1N=1 } 
T{s1N =0} < xL < 
T{s2N=0, s1N=0 } 
  
 
Let's analyze how quality of the signal affects decision of F2 under stronger information 
externality, i.e. after F2 observed deposit size in the other field (Case 1 vs. Case 3). The 
corresponding cutoffs are ordered as follows: 
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  Case 1 
(Informative Signals)  
Case 3 
(Noisy Signals) 
T{s2I=1, 01} 1) > T{s2N=1, 01} 
T{s2I=0, 11} < T{s2N=0, 11} 2) 
T{s2I=0, 01} < T{s2N=0, 01} 3) 
 
1) states that if F2 observes low reserves in the neighboring field after it received a high 
signal, F2 is more likely to drill in its field if the signal is informative rather than noisy. 2) and 3) 
imply that when F2 received a low informative or noisy signal and observes the reserves of the 
other field, it is more likely to drill in its field when this signal is noisy rather than informative. 
In other words, F2 is more likely to decide against its signal in the noisier environment. This 
suggests the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5 
Given F2 received a private signal and observes the reserves of the other field, it is more likely to 
contradict its signal when the signal is noisy rather than informative. 
     
Proposition 5 predicts that after a successful drilling in a region, more firms are going to 
start exploring in their fields when their private information is noisy rather than informative. The 
firms with high informative or noisy signals always drill after observing high reserves in the 
other field. However, more firms with low signals are going to drill under noisy private 
information. Thus, after oil has been found in a field, we should expect more exploratory drilling 
in neighboring areas when private information firms receive is noisy rather than informative. 
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Now, let's see how quality of private information alters choice of F2 under weaker 
information externality, i.e. when it only observes the decision of F1 (Cases 2 vs. Case 4). From 
Table 4.5.1 it is seen that in Case 2 F2 is able to use information externalities when xL > T{s1I =0}. 
Similarly, F2 will take advantage of information externalities in Case 4 when xL > T{s1N =0}. Note 
that T{s1N =0} > T{s1I =0}. Hence, if parameters are such that information externalities are present in 
Case 4, they will be present in Case 2 as well. This allows us to compare the cases. 
    Table 4.5.1 shows that F2 is more likely to contradict its high signal when both firms 
received noisy private information. Under informative signals (Case 2), F2 always follows its 
private information after receiving a high signal. Under noisy signals (Case 4), F2 always follows 
its high signal if it observes F2's decision to drill but may contradict its high signal after it 
observes F2's decision not to drill. 
    After F2 received a low signal and observes that F1 decided not to drill in its field, it 
will never drill under informative signals (Case 2), but may contradict its low signal under noisy 
signals (Case 4). Comparing the two cutoffs in the cases when F2 received a low signal and 
observes F1's decision to drill leads to the following result: 
Case 2 
(Informative Signals)  
Case 4 
(Noisy Signals) 
T{s2I=0, s1I=1} ≶ T{ s2N=0, s1N=1} 
iff 
)1(5.01)12)(1(1
12
qorABqaa −<>Θ−−−Θ       
    (31)                         
where A  = (1-a)(1-q)+aq 
 B  = a(1-q)+(1-a)q 
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ii
i θ
θ−=Θ 1  
In this case, whether F2 is more likely or less likely to drill after both firms received 
informative or noisy signals depends on the difference between the quality of the firm's signals. 
Note that AB>a(1-a)(2q-1); then (31) suggests the following: 
⇒Θ≤Θ 12
11  T{s2I=0, s1I=1} < T{ s2N=0, s1N=1} 
(32) 
θi> θj implies that 
ji Θ>Θ
11  . Hence, (32) states that F2 is more likely to contradict its low signal 
after observing F1's decision to drill when both firms received noisy signals and quality of F1's 
signal is either as good as or better than the quality of F2's private signal. 
Note that (32) is necessary but not sufficient condition for T{s2I=0, s1I=1} < T{ s2N=0, s1N=1}. 
Hence, there is θ2> θ1 such that 
12
11
Θ>Θ  and T
{s
2
I=0, s
1
I=1} < T{ s2N=0, s1N=1}. In other words, even 
if the quality of its information is better, F2 may still be more likely to contradict its low signal 
and follow the decision of F1 when both firms receive noisy signals rather than when both firms 
receive informative signals. For F2 to be more likely to follow its signal under noisy private 
information, the quality of its low signal should be above the following threshold: 
)12)(1(
1
)12)(1(
)1(5.01
12 −−Θ+−−
−>Θ qaa
AB
qaa
q  
    Proposition 6 summarizes the analysis above: 
 
Proposition 6. 
Let xL > T{s1N =0}. Then 
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1) Given that F2 received a high or low signal and observes F1's decision not to drill in its field, 
F2 is more likely to contradict its signal when the private information of both firms is noisy 
rather than informative. 
2) Given that F2 received a low signal and observes F1's decision to drill in its field, F2 is more 
likely to contradict its signal and follow the decision of F1 when the private information of both 
firms is noisy rather than informative and the quality of F1's signal is either as good as or better 
than the quality of F2's private signal. For F2 to be more likely to follow its noisy low signal, the 
quality of its private information should be high enough to satisfy the following condition: 
)12)(1(
1
)12)(1(
)1(5.01
12 −−Θ+−−
−>Θ qaa
AB
qaa
q  
  
Proposition 6 implies that under weaker noisy private information, F2 is more likely to 
contradict its signal and follow the decision of F1. F2 may mimic the decision of the other firm to 
drill even when the quality of its signal is either as good as or even better than the quality of F1's 
private information. Under noisy private and public information, the second firm to decide may 
undervalue the information provided by its signal and give too much weight to the information 
provided through the information externality. 
Proposition 6 predicts that under noisy public and private information, we can expect 
more firms to start drilling after the first firm has decided to drill in its track. The firms with high 
noisy or informative signals will always drill after observing the first firm's decision to explore in 
its field. As for the firms with low signals, they will be more likely to choose to drill under noisy 
information if the quality of their private information is either worse or the same as the quality of 
the signal of the firm that decided to drill first. 
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Both propositions 5 and 6 suggest that after receiving a low signal, F2 is more likely to 
contradict its private information in the noisier environment. The next natural step is to check 
whether it is more likely to contradict its noisy low signal under weaker or stronger information 
externalities, i.e. after observing reserves in the other field or after just observing the decision of 
F2 (Case 3 vs. Case 4). The corresponding thresholds are ranked as follows: 
Case 3 
(Stronger Information 
Externality) 
 
Case 4 
(Weaker Information 
Externality) 
1) T{s2N=0, 11} > T{s2N=0, s1N=1} 
2) 
 
T{s2I=0, 01} < T{s2N=0, s1N=0} 
 
This proves Proposition 7: 
 
Proposition 7 
1) After receiving a low noisy signal, F2 is more likely to contradict its private information after 
observing the high reserves in the other field than after observing F1's decision to drill. 
2) After receiving a low noisy signal, F2 is more likely to contradict its private information after 
observing F1's decision not to drill that after observing the low reserves in the other field. 
 
Part 1 of Proposition 7 together with part 2 of Proposition 6 suggest an explanation to the 
spike of investment in the Caspian region. In particular, part 2 of proposition 6 explains why 
more companies entered the Caspian region despite their relatively low private information after 
the first contract had appeared. The first company to invest was a major; its decision could have 
influenced the drilling decisions of the companies of the same or lower level of expertise. Part 1 
of proposition 7 suggests why more companies appeared in the region after the first major's 
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successful exploration efforts became public. Positive drilling results could have affected 
decision of the companies with high signals as well as the companies with low signals and 
different levels of expertise. 
Part 2 of Proposition 7 suggests why almost no companies came to the region after two 
projects found no oil. After bad drilling results became known, only companies with low noisy 
signals became less likely to contradict its private information and invest in the region. 
4.6 CONCLUSION  
In the essay we attempt to explain why in the environment with information externalities and 
sequential decision-making the oil companies tend to drill more. As an example, we use the 
exploration of the Caspian region. we show that under noisy available public and private 
information, the oil companies are more likely to follow the decision of the first company if its 
level of expertise is as good or better. The companies will be even more likely to follow the 
decision of the first firm after it released results of successful exploratory efforts. However, the 
result of poor exploratory efforts will make companies more cautious in making their investment 
decision. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION  
 
It has been widely documented that after 1998 the GDP in Russia has grown at an impressive 
average annual rate of more than 6%; the GDP of the Caspian states has been growing even 
faster: 9% in Kazakhstan and 19.7% in Azerbaijan (CIA World Fact Book, 2005). One of the 
major concerns with this growth record, however, is that it is driven primarily by high oil prices 
rather than deep structural reform (see Berglöf et al., 2003). In the first essay, we have 
documented that the Russian oil sector is in need of substantial restructuring. In particular, the 
privatization of the crude oil sector has been partial because the federal government as of 2003 
has both retained monopoly control over the transport of crude oil onto world markets and has 
also obtained substantial positions and influence on some oil company boards. This has created 
major inefficiencies in the allocation of scarce export capacity because the federal government 
has used its control over the pipeline to provide privileged access to those companies over which 
it has influence. In particular, by 2003 fully private companies had to be much more productive 
than state-influence companies to receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence 
companies had preferential access to routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route 
capacity was sensitive to transport costs only among those companies in which the state has 
substantial representation on boards.    
The second and the third essays argue that the influx of foreign investment into the 
Caspian region in 1997-1998 was largely influenced by available noisy information. However, a 
vast increase in foreign direct investment did not promote sustainable economic development in 
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the region because its inflow turned out to be quite fragile: the foreign investors stopped coming 
to the country as soon as bad news on the size of the Caspian reserves came in. The decision to 
enter Caspian oil development projects turned out to be costly for many investors because they 
paid too much attention to publicly available information and too little to their private signals. 
On the other hand, the Caspian states were hurt by the release of negative information because it 
prevented further expansion of oil development projects in the region.   
There is another interesting question that has not been addressed in this dissertation. The 
Caspian states are landlocked. The Russian federal government has near monopoly power over 
the shipping of the oil produced there. However, since 2003 the Russian federal government’s 
near monopoly position as the regional transporter of crude oil exports has been threatened. 
Starting in 2003, substantial progress has been made in establishing routes for oil companies 
located in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan that would enable them to bypass Russia as they pump 
their oil onto world markets.  
This development during 2003-2006 is important for several reasons. First, it is important 
to understand and document the extent to which state monopolies such as the Russian oil 
transport sector adapt to international competition. In particular, does the threat of some entry 
encourage the Russian government to compete with potential entrants by taking measures such 
as providing additional capacity clients, lowering tariffs and providing more transparent access? 
Or, do bureaucrats in the energy sector believe that they can ignore the threat of entry? Second, 
the Caspian region is becoming a major source of world oil and gas, and we need a better 
understanding of just how the transport of oil from the landlocked countries surrounding the 
Caspian is evolving.  
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In our future research (joint with Daniel Berkowitz), we plan to collect company level 
corporate governance data, company-subsidiary level crude oil export data, company-subsidiary 
level productivity data, company-subsidiary level capacity data, route level cost data, capacity 
data, and regional specific price data for 2004, 2005 and 2006 to test whether or not the Russian 
federal government has continued its practice (that we documented in 2003) of providing 
privileged access to the companies over which it has influence. However, taking advantage of 
new data sources, we will add companies located in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to our data set. If 
the Russian federal energy bureaucracy is ignoring the real threat of the emergence of a non-
Russian oil pipeline bypass, then we would observe that the Azeri and Kazakh companies have 
received the same limited access to the oil pipeline that other state-independent companies such 
as Tatneft and Yukos received during 2003.  However, if the Russian federal energy bureaucracy 
is responding to this threat of entry, we would observe two possible outcomes: 1) the Azeri and 
Kazakh companies get the privileged access to the pipeline that has been given to state-influence 
companies such as LUKoil and Rosneft in 2003; and 2) the Russian government eliminates the 
entire system of privileges and increases the overall transparency of its pipeline system.  
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
Interviewee # Date Country Category Company/Organization
1 03.02.2004 Azerbaijan 
NGO, 
Academy, 
Politics 
Azerbaijan’s Center for 
Economic and Political 
Research, 
Entrepreneurship 
Development Foundation 
2 03.03.2004 Azerbaijan NGO Center for Civil Initiatives 
3 03.03.2004 Azerbaijan NGO 
Open Society Institute-
Assistance Foundation, 
Azerbaijan 
4 03.04.2004 Azerbaijan NGO Public Finance Monitoring Center 
5 03.04.2004 Azerbaijan Politics Budgetary Committee in the Parliament 
6 03.05.2004 Azerbaijan Company Exxon Azerbaijan  
7 03.05.2004 Azerbaijan Company BP Group Azerbaijan 
Public Finance 
Monitoring Center 8 03.05.2004 
Azerbaijan NGO 
9 03.09.2004 Azerbaijan Academy 
Azerbaijan State Oil 
Academy, Azerbaijan 
National Academy of Science 
10 03.10.2004 Azerbaijan Company BP Group Azerbaijan 
11 03.15.2004 Azerbaijan Company BP Group Azerbaijan 
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APPENDIX B 
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX FOR ESSAY 3 
B.1 A MODEL OF SEQUENTIAL EXPLORATION 
B.1.1 P. 85 
 
1) Pr(siI = ri|ri) > Pr(siI ≠ ri|ri) 
    (a)  Pr(siI = 1i|1i) > Pr(siI = 0i|1i) 
          Φ(f(1i)) > 1 – Φ(f(1i))  
           True since Φ(f(1i)) >0.5 
 
    (b)  Pr(siI = 0i|0i) > Pr(siI = 1i|0i) 
          1 – Φ(f(0i)) > Φ(f(0i))  
           True since Φ(f(0i)) <0.5 
 
2) Pr({siI,sjI }= {1,1}|1i,1j) > Pr({siI,sjI }≠ {1,1}|1i,1j) 
    (a) Pr(siI = 1, sjI = 1|1i,1j) > Pr(siI =1, sjI =0|1i,1j) 
         Φ(f(1i))2 > Φ(f(1i)) [1 – Φ(f(1i))] 
         True since Φ(f(1i)) >0.5 
 
    (b) Pr(siI = 1, sjI = 1|1i,1j) > Pr(siI, = 0, sjI  = 1|1i,1j) 
         Φ(f(1i))2 > [1 – Φ(f(1i))] Φ(f(1i)) 
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         True since Φ(f(1i)) >0.5 
 
    (c) Pr(siI = 1, sjI  = 1|1i,1j) > Pr({siI = 0, sjI = 0|1i,1j) 
         Φ(f(1i))2 > [1 – Φ(f(1i))]2 
         True since Φ(f(1i)) >0.5 
 
Pr({siI,sjI} = {1,0}|1i,0j) > Pr({siI,sjI} ≠ {1i,0j}|1i,0j) 
    (a) Pr(siI = 1, sjI = 0|1i,0j) > Pr(siI= 1, sjI = 1|1i,0j) 
         Φ(f(1i)) [1 – Φ(f(0i))]> Φ(f(1i)) Φ(f(0i)) 
          True since Φ(f(1i)) >0.5; Φ(f(0i)) <0.5 
 
   (b) Pr(siI  = 1, sjI = 0|1i,0j) > Pr(siI = 0, sjI = 1|1i,0j) 
         [1 – Φ(f(0i))] Φ(f(1i)) > Φ(f(1i)) Φ(f(0i)) 
         True since Φ(f(1i)) >0.5; Φ(f(0i)) <0.5 
 
   (c) Pr(siI = 1, sjI = 0|1i,0j) > Pr(siI = 0, sjI = 0|1i,0j) 
         [1 – Φ(f(0i))] Φ(f(1i)) > Φ(f(0i)) Φ(f(0i)) 
         True since Φ(f(1i)) >0.5; Φ(f(0i)) <0.5 
 
Pr({siI,sjI}={0,0}|0i,0j) > Pr({siI,sjI}≠{0i,0j}|0i,0j) 
   (a) Pr(siI = 0, sjI = 0|0i,0j) > Pr(siI= 1, sjI = 1|0i,0j) 
        [1 – Φ(f(0i))]2 > Φ(f(0i))2 
        True since Φ(f(0i)) <0.5 
 
   (b) Pr(siI  = 0, sjI = 0|0i,0j) > Pr(siI = 0, sjI = 1|0i,0j) 
         [1 – Φ(f(0i))]2 > Φ(f(0i)) [1 – Φ(f(0i))] 
         True since Φ(f(0i)) <0.5 
 
   (c) Pr(siI = 0, sjI = 0|0i,0j) > Pr(siI = 1, sjI = 0|0i,0j) 
         [1 – Φ(f(0i))]2  > [1 – Φ(f(0i))]Φ(f(0i)) 
         True since Φ(f(0i)) <0.5 
 116 
B.1.2  P. 87 
 
Pr(siI = 1,sj=1)=Pr(siI=0,sj=0)  > Pr(siI=1,sj=0)=Pr(siI=0,sj=1) 
1
1
)1(2)1(
1
)]1((2)1([
1
)1(2)1()1(2
1
)1(
1
 a)q-a(1q)-a)²(1-0.5(1  q)-0.5a²(1   q)-a)(1-a(1a)²q-0.5(1  0.5a²q       
2222
2222
>−⇔
−−−+>−−−−+⇔
−−+−+>−+−−+−⇔
++>++
q
q
aaaa
q
qaaaa
q
qaaaaaa
q
qa
q
qa
 
True since  
q > 0.5 and  
5.0 allfor 
048)]1((2)1([ since
0)1((2)1( 
22
22
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a
a
a
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 B.2 CASE 1 
B.2.1 P. 88 
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B.2.2  P. 89. Table 4.4.1.1 
 
1) T{s2I =1; 11}  
HL
LH
I
x
q
q
a
ax
xqaaqxsE
−−<⇒>
−−−==Π
11
0
)1)(1(22}1,1{| 122
 
 
2) T{s2I =1; 01} 
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3) T{s2I =0; 11} 
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B.2.3 P. 89 
 
xL < T{s2I =1; 11} for all a, q > 0.5  
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B.2.4  P. 90 
 
1) T{s2I=1,01} > T{s2I=0,01} 
22 )1(
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True since a > 0.5 
 
2) T{s2I=0,11} > T{s2I=0,01} 
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True since q > 0.5 
 
3) T{s2I=1,01} ≷ T{s2I=0,11} iff q
qor
a
a
−<>− 11      
q
qor
a
a
x
q
q
a
aorx
q
q
a
a
HH
−<>−⇔
−
−<>−−
11
1
11
1
    
 120 
 B.3 CASE 2 
B.3.1 P. 92: Table 4.4.2.1 
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B.3.3 P. 93: Table 4.4.2.2 
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)1(2)1(2)1()1(2
)1(2)1(}01,12{|2
2
2
 
 
3) T{s2I =0; s1I =1}  
HL
HL
x
qaqa
qaaq
a
ax
x
qaaqa
qaqaax
Lxqaaqaqa
qaaqa
Hxqaaqaqa
qaqaaIsIsE
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−−+−<⇔
−+−
−−+−<⇒>
−+−−+−
−+−−
−+−−+−
−−+−===Π
)1()1(
)1)(1(1
)1()1(
)1()1()1(0
)1(2)1(2)1()1(2
)1()1(2
)1(2)1(2)1()1(2
)1(2)1()1(}11,02{|2
2
2
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4) T{s2I =0; s1I =0}  
HL
HL
LH
II
x
aqqa
qaqa
a
ax
x
qaqaa
qaaqax
x
qaaqaqa
qaqaax
qaaqaqa
qaaqassE
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−−
−+−−<⇔
+−−
−−+−<⇒>
−−+−+
+−−−−−+−+
−−+−===Π
)1)(1(
)1()1(1
)1)(1(
)1)(1()1(0
)1)(1(2)1(
)1)(1(
)1)(1(2)1(
)1)(1()1(}0,0{|
2
2
22
2
22
2
122
 
B.3.4  P. 93 
 
1)  xL< T{s2I=1, s1I=1 } for all a, q > 0.5  
1
)1()1(
)1)(1(
1
])1()1()[1()1)1((Then      
)1(                                     
)12)(1()12(                           
)1)(1()1()1(                      
)1()1()1)(1(5,0,
)1()1(
)1)(1(
1
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−−+
−⇒
−+−−>−−+
−>
−−>−
−−−−>−−
−+−>−−+⇒>
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−−+
−<
qaqa
qaaq
a
a
qaqaaqaaqa
aa
qaqa
qaqaqaaq
qaqaqaaqqa
x
qaqa
qaaq
a
ax HL
 
 
2) xL< T{s2I=1, s1I=0 } for all a, q > 0.5 
 
1
)1)(1(
)1()1(
1
)1(                                       
)1()1()1()1()1(5.0,
)1)(1(
)1()1(
1
22
22
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−−
−+−
−⇒
−>
−+−−>−+−⇒>
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−−
−+−
−<
aqqa
qaqa
a
a
aa
qaaqaqaqaaqa
x
aqqa
qaqa
a
ax HL
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B.4  CASE 3 
B.4.1 P. 96: Table 4.4.3.1 
 
1) T{s2N =1; 11} 
HL
HL
LH
LU
U
HU
U
LI
I
HI
I
N
x
q
q
a
ax
x
qa
qax
xqaqxa
x
s
sx
s
s
x
s
sx
s
ssE
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−+<⇔
−−+−
−+<⇒>
−−+−−−+=
=
=−=
=−+
=
=−=
===Π
1)1()1(2
)1(2
)1)](1()1(2[
)]1(2[0
)1)](1()1(2[)]1(2[
)1Pr()1Pr(
)1,0Pr()1,0|1Pr(
)1Pr()1Pr(
)1,1Pr()1,1|1Pr()(1(
)
)1Pr()1Pr(
)1,0Pr()1,0|1Pr(
)1Pr()1Pr(
)1,1Pr()1,1|1Pr((}1,1{|
22
22
22
22
2222
12
12122
12
12122
2
12
12122
12
12122
2122
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθθθ
θ
θ
 
 
2) T{s2N =1; 01} 
HL
HL
LH
LU
U
HU
U
LI
I
HI
I
N
x
q
q
a
ax
x
qa
qax
qxaxqa
x
s
sx
s
s
x
s
sx
s
ssE
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−+<⇔
−+−
−−+<⇒>
−+−−−−+=
=
=−=
=−+
=
=−=
===Π
1
)1()1(2
)1(2
)]1()1(2[
)1)](1(2[0
)]1()1(2[)1)](1(2[
)0Pr()1Pr(
)0,0Pr()0,0|1Pr(
)0Pr()1Pr(
)0,1Pr()0,1|1Pr()(1(
)
)0Pr()1Pr(
)0,0Pr()0,0|1Pr(
)0Pr()1Pr(
)0,1Pr()0,1|1Pr((}0,1{|
22
22
22
22
2222
12
12122
12
12122
2
12
12122
12
12122
2122
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθθθ
θ
θ
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3) T{s2N =0; 11} 
HL
HL
LH
LU
U
HU
U
LI
I
HI
I
N
x
q
q
a
ax
x
qa
qax
xqaqxa
x
s
sx
s
s
x
s
sx
s
ssE
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
−+−<⇔
−−+
−+−<⇒>
−−+−−+−=
=
=−=
=−+
=
=−=
===Π
1)1(2
)1()1(2
)1)](1(2[
)]1()1(2[0
)1)](1(2[)]1()1(2[
)1Pr()0Pr(
)1,0Pr()1,0|0Pr(
)1Pr()0Pr(
)1,1Pr()1,1|0Pr()(1(
)
)1Pr()0Pr(
)1,0Pr()1,0|0Pr(
)1Pr()0Pr(
)1,1Pr()1,1|0Pr((}1,0{|
22
22
22
22
2222
12
12122
12
12122
2
12
12122
12
12122
2122
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθθθ
θ
θ
 
 
4) T{s2N =0; 01} 
HL
HL
LH
LU
U
HU
U
LI
I
HI
I
N
x
q
q
a
ax
x
qa
qax
qxaxqa
x
s
sx
s
s
x
s
sx
s
ssE
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
−+−<⇔
−+
−−+−<⇒>
−+−−−+−=
=
=−=
=−+
=
=−=
===Π
1
)1(2
)1()1(2
)]1(2[
)1)](1()1(2[0
)]1(2[)1)](1()1(2[
)0Pr()0Pr(
)0,0Pr()0,0|0Pr(
)0Pr()0Pr(
)0,1Pr()0,1|0Pr()(1(
)
)0Pr()0Pr(
)0,0Pr()0,0|0Pr(
)0Pr()0Pr(
)0,1Pr()0,1|0Pr((}0,0{|
22
22
22
22
2222
12
12122
12
12122
2
12
12122
12
12122
2122
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθθθ
θ
θ
 
 
B.4.2 P. 96 
xL < T{s2N=1, 11} for all a, q > 0.5  
1
1)1()1(2
)1(2
)]1()1(2)[1()]1(2[                
)1()1(2)1(25.0,
1)1()1(2
)1(2
22
22
2222
2222
22
22
>−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−+⇒
−+−−>−+⇒
−+−>−+⇒>
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−+<
q
q
a
a
aqaq
aaqa
x
q
q
a
ax HL
θθ
θθ
θθθθ
θθθθ
θθ
θθ
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B.4.3  P. 96-97 
 
1) T{s2N =1; 01} > T{s2N =0; 01} 
2
22
2
22
22
22
22
22
)]1(2[)]1(2[
1
)1(2
)1()1(21
)1()1(2
)1(2
θθθθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
−+>−+⇔
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
−+−>−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−+
aa
x
q
q
a
ax
q
q
a
a
HH
 
True since a > 0.5 
 
2) T{s2N =0; 11} > T{s2N =0; 01} 
22
22
22
22
22
)1(
1
)1(2
)1()1(2
1)1(2
)1()1(2
qq
x
q
q
a
ax
q
q
a
a
HH
−>⇔
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
−+−>−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
−+−
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
 
True since q > 0.5 
 
1) T{s2N =1; 01} ≷ T{s2N =0; 11} iff q
qor
a
a
−<>−+−
−+
1)1()1(2
)1(2
22
22
θθ
θθ  
q
qor
a
a
x
q
q
a
aorx
q
q
a
a
HH
−<>−+−
−+⇔
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
−+−<>−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−+
1)1()1(2
)1(2
1)1(2
)1()1(21
)1()1(2
)1(2
22
22
22
22
22
22
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
θθ
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B.5  CASE 4 
B.5.1 P. 98: Table 4.4.4.1  
 
1) T{s1N =1} 
HL
LH
L
U
H
U
L
I
H
IN
x
a
ax
xaxa
xsxsxsxssE
)1()1(2
)1(20
)]1()1(2[)]1(2[
])0|1Pr()1|1)[Pr(1(])0|1Pr()1|1[Pr(}1{|
11
11
1111
111111111111
θθ
θθ
θθθθ
θθ
−+−
−+<⇒>
−+−−−+=
=−=−+=−===Π
 
 
2) T{s1N =0} 
Hxa
a
Lx
LxaHxa
Lx
UsHx
UsLx
IsHx
IsNsE
)11(12
)11()1(120
)]11(12[)]11()1(12[
])10|01Pr()11|01)[Pr(11(])10|01Pr()11|01[Pr(1}01{|1
θθ
θθ
θθθθ
θθ
−+
−+−<⇒>
−+−−+−=
=−=−+=−===Π
 
 
B.5.2 B.5.2 P. 100 
 
Pr(siI = 1,sjU=1) = Pr(siI=1,sjU0) = Pr(siI=0,sjU=1) = Pr(siI=0,sjU=0)  
=  [0.5a + 0.5(1-a)] 0.5q+[0.5a + 0.5(1-a)] 0.5(1-q)= 0.25 
Pr(siU = 1,sjU=1) = Pr(siU=1,sjU0) = Pr(siU=0,sjU=1) = Pr(siU=0,sjU=0)  
= (0.5) 0.5q + (0.5) 0.5(1-q) = 0.25 
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B.5.3 P.100: Table 4.4.4.4 
 
 
 
}1,2{|2)11)(21(}1,2{|21)21(                                      
}1,2{|2)11(2}1,2{|212}1,2{|2
UsUsEIsUsE
UsIsEIsIsENsNsE
Π−−+Π−+
Π−+Π=Π
θθθθ
θθθθ
1) T{s2N=1, s1N=1 } 
]
]
      
0
)11)(21(5.0)1(2)11(])1()1()[21(1                                 
)1)(1(22)1(2
)1)(1(2)1(
12                            
)11)(21(5.02)11()]1)(1()[21(1                                 
)1)(1(22)1(2
)1)(1(2
12}11,12{|2
)}11)(21(5.0)1(2)11(])1()1()[21(1)]{1)(1(2
2)1(2[)]1)(1(2)1[(12
)}11)(21(5.02)11()]1)(1()[21(1)]{1)(1(2
2)1(2[)]1)(1(2[12
Hx
aqaqaqaaqaqaqaaqa
aqaaqqaaqaqaqaaqa
Lx
Lxaqaqa
qaaqaqa
qaaqa
Hxaqaaq
qaaqaqa
qaaqaNsNsE
θθθθθθθθ
θθθθθθθθ
θθθθθθ
θθ
θθθθθθ
θθ
−−+−−+−+−−−−+−++−−+−
−−+−+−−+−−−+−++−−+<
⇒>
−−+−−+−+−−+
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−+−+
−−+−−
−−+−+−−+−+
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−+−+
−−+===Π
 
Divide both sides of the above expression by θ2θ1: 
      
}
1
)11(
2
)21(5.0)1(
1
)11(])1()1([
2
)21()]{1)(1(22)1(2[)]1)(1(2)1[(
)}
2
)21(
1
)11(5.0
21
)11()]1)(1([
2
)21()]{1)(1(22)1(2[)]1)(1(2[
Hx
aqaqaqaaqaqaqaaqa
aqaaqqaaqaqaqaaqa
Lx
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
−−
+−
−
+−+−
−
−−+−++−−+−
−−
+
−
+−−+
−
−−+−++−−+
<⇒  
Let 
i
i
i θ
θ−=Θ 1 . Then the above expression can be re-written as: 
      
)}5.0)1(])1()1([)]{1)(1(2)1([)]1)(1()1[(
}5.0)]1)(1([)]{1)(1(2)1([)]1)(1([
1212
222
1212
222
HL xaqaqaqaaqaqaqaaqa
aqaaqqaaqaqaqaaqax ΘΘ+−Θ+−+−Θ−−+−++−−+−
ΘΘ+Θ+−−+Θ−−+−++−−+<⇒  
Recall that A  = (1-a)(1-q)+aq 
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 her simplified as: 
                  B  = a(1-q)+(1-a)q. 
The above threshold can be furt
      
]5.0)1[(
)1(
)1(
)5.0(
)1(
}5.0)1()]{)1([)1(
}5.0]{)1([
212
212
1212
1212
HL
HL
x
aB
BaaA
Ba
aA
BaaA
aA
x
x
aBBaaABa
aABaaAaAx
Θ+−Θ+Θ+−+
−
Θ+Θ+Θ+−+<⇔
ΘΘ+−Θ+Θ−++−
ΘΘ+Θ+Θ−++<⇒
 
Let  
.
)1(
)1(
,
)1(
BaaA
BaD
BaaA
aAC =
−+
−=
−+
 
Then the threshold becomes: 
      
]5.0)1[(
)5.0(
212
212
HL xaBD
aACx Θ+−Θ+Θ+
Θ+Θ+Θ+<⇔  
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2) T{s2N=1, s1N=0 } 
]
]
      
0
)1)(1(5.0)1()1(])1)(1)[(1(                            
)1(2)1()1()1(
)1()1()1(                        
)1)(1(5.0)1()]1()1)[(1(                            
)1(2)1()1()1(
)1()1(}0,1{|
)}11)(21(5.0)1(2)11(])1)(1)[(21(1]{)1(2)1(
2)1()1(2[)]1(2)1()1([12
)}11)(21(5.02)11()]1()1)[(21(1]{)1(2)1(
2)1()1(2[)]1(2)1([12
122121
22
2
12
122121
22
2
12122
Hx
aaqqaqaaqaqaqaqaa
aqaqaqaaqaqaqaqaa
Lx
L
H
NN
xaaqqa
qaaqaqa
qaaqa
xaqaqa
qaaqaqa
qaqaassE
θθθθθθθθ
θθθθθθθθ
θθθθθθ
θθ
θθθθθθ
θθ
−−+−−++−−−−+−−+−+−−+−
−−+−+−+−−−+−−+−+−+−<
⇒>
−−+−−++−−−+
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−−+−
−+−−−
−−+−+−+−−+
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−−+−
−+−===Π
 
Following the steps in (1), the above threshold can be re-written as: 
      
]5.0)1[(
)1(
)1(
)5.0(
)1(
}5.0)1()]{)1[()1(
}5.0]{)1[(
212
212
1212
1212
HL
HL
x
aA
aBAa
Aa
aB
aBAa
aB
x
x
aAaBAaAa
aBaBAaaBx
Θ+−Θ+Θ++−
−
Θ+Θ+Θ++−<⇔
ΘΘ+−Θ+Θ+−+−
ΘΘ+Θ+Θ+−+<⇒
 
Let  
.
)1(
,
)1(
)1(
aBAa
aBF
aBAa
AaE
+−=
+−
−=
 
Then the threshold becomes: 
      
]5.0)1[(
)5.0(
212
212
HL xaAE
aBFx Θ+−Θ+Θ+
Θ+Θ+Θ+<⇔  
3) T{s2N=0, s1N=1 } 
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]]
      
0
)1)(1(5.0)1(])1()1()[(1(                             
)1(2)1()1()1(
)1()1(                        
)1)(1(5.0)1()1()]1)(1()[1(                             
)1(2)1()1()1(
)1()1()1(}1,0{|
)}11)(21(5.02)11(])1()1()[21(1]{)1(2)1(
2)1()1(2[)]1(2)1([12
)}11)(21(5.0)1(2)11()]1)(1()[(21(1]{)1(2)1(
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122121
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2
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aqaqaqaaqaqaqaqaa
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L
H
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qaaqaqa
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θθθθθθθθ
θθθθθθθθ
θθθθθθ
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θθθθθθ
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−−+−+−+−−−+−−+−+−+−
−−+−−+−−+−−+−−+−+−−+−<
⇒>
−−+−+−+−−+
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−−+−
−+−−
−−+−−+−−+−+
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−−+−
−−+−===Π
 
Following the steps in (1), the above threshold can be re-written as: 
      
)5.0(
)1(
]5.0)1[(
)1(
)1(
}5.0)]{)1[(
}5.0)1(]{)1[()1(
212
212
1212
1212
HL
HL
x
aB
aBAa
aB
aA
aBAa
Aa
x
x
aBaBAaaB
aAaBAaAax
Θ+Θ+Θ++−
Θ+−Θ+Θ++−
−
<⇔
ΘΘ+Θ+Θ+−+
ΘΘ+−Θ+Θ+−+−<⇒
 
Let  
.
)1(
,
)1(
)1(
aBAa
aB
F
aBAa
Aa
E
+−=
+−
−=
 
Then the threshold becomes: 
      
)5.0(
]5.0)1[(
212
212
HL xaBF
aAE
x Θ+Θ+Θ+
Θ+−Θ+Θ+<⇔  
4) T{s2N=0, s1N=0 } 
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]]
      
0
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)1(2)1(
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)1(2)1(
)1()1)(1(}0,0{|
)}11)(21(5.02)11(])1)(1)[(21(1]{)1(2
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2
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2
12122
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aqaqaqaaqaqaqaqaa
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L
H
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qaqaa
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θθθθθθθθ
θθθθθθθθ
θθθθθθ
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θθθθθθ
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−−+−−+−+−−−+−++−+−−<
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⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−+
+−−−
−−+−−+−+−−+
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−+
−+−−===Π
 
Following the steps in (1), the above threshold can be re-written as: 
      
]5.0[
)1(
)1(
]5.0)1[(
)1(
)1(
}5.0)]{)1([
}5.0)1(]{)1([)1(
212
212
1212
1212
HL
HL
x
aA
BaaA
Aa
aB
BaaA
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x
x
aABaaAaA
aBBaaABax
Θ+Θ+Θ+−+
−
Θ+−Θ+Θ+−+
−
<⇔
ΘΘ+Θ+Θ−++
ΘΘ+−Θ+Θ−++−<⇒
 
Let  
.
)1(
,
)1(
)1(
BaaA
aAC
BaaA
BaD
−+=
−+
−=
 
Then the threshold becomes: 
      
]5.0[
]5.0)1[(
212
212
HL xaAC
aBD
x Θ+Θ+Θ+
Θ+−Θ+Θ+<⇔  
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B.5.4 P. 101 
 
xL< T{s2N=1, s1N=1 } for all a, q > 0.5 
      
)1(
)12)(1()12(
)1)(1()1()1(
)1()1()1)(1(
)1
]5.0)1[(
)5.0(
212
212
aa
qaqa
qaqaqaaq
qaqaaqqa
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x
aBD
aACx HL
−>⇔
−−>−⇔
−−−−>−−⇔
−+−>+−−⇔
>
Θ+−Θ+Θ+
Θ+Θ+Θ+<
 
      
)1(    and    5.0
)1(
)1(
)1(
)2
BaaABAa
BaaA
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BaaA
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−>⇒>>
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−>−+⇔
>
 
      
1
]5.0)1[(
)5.0(
]5.0)1[()5.0(
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212212
>Θ+−Θ+Θ+
Θ+Θ+Θ+⇒
Θ+−Θ+Θ+>Θ+Θ+Θ+⇒
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aBDaAC
 
B.5.5 P. 102 
 
1) T{s2N=1, s1N=0 } > T{s2N=0, s1N=0 } 
      
]25.0[12
]25.0)1[(12
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)25.0(12
HxaAC
aBD
HxaAE
aBF
Θ+Θ+Θ+
Θ+−Θ+Θ+>Θ+−Θ+Θ+
Θ+Θ+Θ+
 
True since a > 0.5 and 
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3) T{s2N=1, s1N=0 }≷ T{s2N=0, s1N=1 } 
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B.6  COMPARISON OF FIRM 2’S DECISIONS UNDER DIFFERENT 
INFORMATION STRUCTURES 
 
B.6.1 P. 105 
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 2) T{s2I=0, 01} < T{s2N=0, 01} 
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B.6.2 P. 106-107 
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B.6.3  P. 109 
 
1) T{s2N=0, 11} > T{s2N=0, s1N=1} 
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 2) T{s2N=0, 01} < T{s2N=0, s1N=0} 
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